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


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THESIS

SOVIET-INDIAN RELATIONS AND THE
INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE

by

Thomas McClintock Price

December 1981

Thesis Advisors: Claude A. Buss
Boyd F. Huff

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Soviet-Indian Relations and the
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
A.B., Duke University, 1975

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

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On 16 December 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2832 (XXVI) declaring the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with its air space and sea bed, to be a zone of peace. The resolution also called upon the Great Powers to enter into negotiations with the littoral states of the region to halt any further escalation of their military presence and to eliminate all bases and other Great Power competition. This paper examines the history of the zone of peace process as it relates to the interests of three states: the United States, the Soviet Union, and India. Particular attention is devoted to the Soviet and Indian positions, and how each nation's regional interests have led to divergent views on the topic. The work concludes that previous attempts to make the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace have concentrated on drafting international resolutions and reducing naval arms, while ignoring the central problem of competing national interests. Confidence-building measures related to these interests would be a better approach, now that naval arms reduction talks are deadlocked.

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I. INTRODUCTION

On 16 December 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2832 (XXVI) declaring the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with its air space and sea bed, to be a zone of peace. The resolution also called upon the Great Powers to enter into negotiations with the littoral states of the region to halt any further escalation of their military presence and to eliminate all bases and other Great Power competition. Yet today, ten years since this resolution was adopted, negotiations over the withdrawal of non-littoral forces from the region are deadlocked, and the prospects of the Indian Ocean ever becoming a zone of peace appear grim.

This paper retraces the history of the zone of peace process and examines what the resolution means to two close friends in Asia: the Soviet Union and India. Whereas many studies of the zone of peace issue focus on a means of reducing the non-littoral naval presence in the region, this work concentrates on the clash of interests. The thesis of this work is that nations cannot realistically sit down to discuss disarmament before the national interests of all parties have been defined and accommodated.

In chapter two, a brief history of the zone of peace process, it will be seen that the Carter Administration

entered Naval Arms Limitation Talks (NALT) without having defined U.S. interests, or the force levels necessary to defend them in an emergency. When Soviet activity increased on the Horn of Africa in the midst of NALT, the Administration was forced to take account of its strategic interests. After making these calculations, the Administration realized that an augmentation of the U.S. presence, and not a reduction or a freeze, was in order.

Chapter three discusses Moscow's interest in the Indian Ocean and the zone of peace resolution. As will be seen, enactment of the nonaligned nations' proposal would fulfill some Soviet strategic objectives; but it would also eliminate certain rights currently guaranteed by international law. Thus far, Moscow has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate a reduction of naval armaments on its southern flank, but has never considered eliminating other forms of superpower competition.

Chapter four examines the foreign policy objectives of India, a nonaligned nation on the littoral of the Indian Ocean. Although Moscow and New Delhi have enjoyed a close post-war relationship, their views diverge on the zone of peace issue. Moscow subscribes to the balance-of-power theory, and believes that withdrawal of Western armed forces from the Indian Ocean would enhance Soviet influence within the region. India, on the other hand, believes that withdrawal of non-littoral forces would result in an

increase in the power of nonaligned nations, to the detriment of both Eastern and Western influence. More importantly, India views such a withdrawal as the first step toward realizing its destiny as the premier power of the Indian Ocean, and one of the Great Powers in international arbitration.

The final chapter reflects upon the question of interests in international negotiations. The zone of peace resolution challenges non-littoral interests because it attempts to circumvent the norms of international law. By placing regional restraints upon international actors, the resolution seeks to serve only regional interests, and thus opens the door to a regional system, governed by the most powerful. This doctrine, which would give nonaligned nations the right to adjudicate events in their own back yard, ironically resembles Soviet action in Eastern Europe and American involvement in the Western Hemisphere. Obviously these are poor substitutes for proper international legislation. The United Nations should be arbitrating agreements which guarantee the equal rights of all states and all citizens; not resolutions which give special privilege to regional or superpower actors.

II. HISTORY OF THE ZONE OF PEACE PROCESS

A. THE POST-WAR YEARS: 1945-1966

Following the second World War, the U.S. Navy established a three-vessel Middle East Force, homeported in the Persian Gulf at Bahrain, in 1949. U.S. interest in the region was largely limited to containing the spread of communism, a task assisted by British and French forces throughout the region.

But in a meeting with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on 17 December 1963, General Maxwell Taylor advised the Indian leader that the U.S. was considering sending some ships of the Seventh Fleet cruising through the Indian Ocean for the purpose of getting acquainted with the seas of the region.[1] When questioned about the conversation during Parliamentary Debates two days later, Prime Minister Nehru indicated a policy consistent with international law:

If the U.S. Government decides to (cruise in these areas), all that we need say...is that outside the territorial waters of India, the ocean is, naturally, open to them, as to the vessels of any other country.[2]

Although the members of Parliament agreed with Nehru's translation of the law, Hem Barua posed a question to the Prime Minister which reflected the anxiety of a growing number of nations in the region:

True it is that the United States' extension of 7th Fleet operations into the Indian Ocean is not dependent on our permission. But may I enquire from our Prime Minister whether this extension, if it is a fait accompli, of course, would not or might not mean an invitation to other powers, particularly antagonistic to us,[3] to do a similar thing, thus jeopardizing our security?[4]

Nehru denied the U.S. presence would represent such an invitation, adding:

I doubt very much if there is any other power which is capable of sending a considerable number of ships roundabout here.[5]

Less than a year later, thinking among many Third World nations had changed. The October 1964 Conference of Nonaligned Nations in Cairo expressed displeasure with international tensions arising out of East-West competition for alliances and pacts. Following the leads of African and Latin American countries seeking to denuclearize their respective continents and various proposals pertaining to the denuclearization of areas in Europe and Asia, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, proposed a resolution, which was accepted by the Conference, calling for the denuclearization of Africa, the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic.[6] Perhaps equally important, the Cairo Conference condemned the maintenance or future establishment of foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean as an indefensible extension of neo-colonialism and imperialism, designed to intimidate the emerging countries of Africa and Asia.

But even as the Conference was registering its opinion, Britain was preparing to create a new colony in 1965 to support communications and transit routes between Africa and the Far East. London arranged the administrative transfer of four of the least populated island groups from two of its crown colonies--the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, and the Aldaba, Desroches, and Farquhar groups from the Seychelles--to form the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT).^[7] This was done with the full agreement of the governments of Mauritius and Seychelles to whom compensation was paid (three million pounds to Mauritius and an international airport constructed in the Seychelles). Following the establishment of the BIOT, an agreement was reached 13 December 1966 between Great Britain and the United States which made Diego Garcia, the largest of the Chagos islands, available for the defense purposes of both countries for an initial period of 50 years.

When the Exchange of Notes was made public in April 1967, there were strong protests from the nonaligned nations of the region. Criticism focused on two issues: the legality of Britain's procurement of the Chagos Archipelago, and the possibility that United States' entry into the Indian Ocean would result in other major powers following its lead. The first complaint stemmed from the

fact that when Britain created the BIOT, both Mauritius and Seychelles were British colonies.

Since U.N. Resolution 1514 prohibits the dismemberment[8] of a country prior to its gaining independence, the nonaligned nations consider the territorial transfers illegal. This feeling was formally registered 4 January 1966 with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2066, which stressed the procedural injustice of the British action, noting:

Any step by the administrating power to detach certain islands from the territory of Mauritius for the purpose of establishment of military bases would be in contravention of resolution number 1514.[9]

U.N. Resolution 2066 represented more than a protracted focus on a legal technicality. It was a message (consistent with previous statements by members of the nonaligned nations) to Great Britain and France that colonialism was not welcomed in the Indian Ocean. These two external powers--and any others representing foreign pacts, alliances, bases and troops--were deemed a threat to regional interests and political sovereignty.

If anything threatened regional interests more than European colonialism, however, it was the possibility of superpower rivalry. While not content with the lingering presence of Britain in the Indian Ocean, the littoral and hinterland countries recognized that British military power in Asia was waning. Some even accepted creation of the

British Indian Ocean Territories to give "transit, staging, communication and refueling facilities to British...planes going to the Far East,"[10] to service British commitments to Malaysia, Australia and Hong Kong if it meant a more rapid departure of the British from all other littoral nations. The British announcement in January 1968 that it would withdraw all military forces from the area between Aden and Singapore by 1972--its "East of Aden"[11] policy-- lent further credence to a belief that the power of the British Empire continued its post-World War II decline.

Criticism of a growing U.S. presence in the region stemmed from a rejection of the Western philosophy which promoted foreign intervention. In this case the philosophy was the balance of power thesis, which foresaw a "power vacuum" in the wake of Britain's withdrawal from the Indian Ocean arena. Western naval analysts,[12] insensitive to the aspirations of the littoral nations to fill any military void left by retreating colonial powers and insecure, even distrustful, of nonalignment policies, stressed "a U.S. obligation" to fill the vacuum. Justifications for the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean included "stemming historical Soviet aspirations for a warm water port," protecting vulnerable sea lanes and chokepoints through which nearly 50% of the world's total oil supplies passed, and emphasis upon the importance of these routes to close allies, particularly Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New

Zealand and the members of ASEAN. Another concern was the instability of the Middle East, and the need for a secondary access route to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea should U.S. interests in the region be threatened by social, economic or political change. Finally, some analysts were disturbed by a growing "regionalism" which contemplated denying free transit to Western commercial and military vessels. Talk of making the Persian Gulf an "Arab Lake," Moscow's Asian Collective Security System; and proposals for regional "sea control" (an Indian Ocean Community) in the course of the zone of peace debates seemed to challenge the right of external nations to use the Indian Ocean in accordance with international law.

In rejecting the balance of power thesis, the littoral nations were demanding a right to adjudicate events in their own backyard. Arguing along lines now familiar in North-South economic conferences, the Indian Ocean countries stated the only way the West could correct a "vacuum" was to help increase the economic strength of the region.

Regional attempts to exclude nuclear weapons, great power rivalries, and competition from the Indian Ocean, are based on historical arguments, such as the following:

...it was the intrusion of...power rivalries into the Indian Ocean, that resulted in the loss of political freedom in Asia in the eighteenth century.[13]

the build up of the British Navy for colonial purposes is well-known...by building a strong navy they were able to dominate a good part of the world and created colonies, and we...became slaves at that time.[14]

Thus, were a scale consisting of "gradations of undesirable possibilities" to be drawn up by the littoral powers, the facility at Diego Garcia, where external nations enjoy unimpeded access to sovereign bases, would represent the least acceptable situation. On its uninhabited atoll far away from Third World political constraints, the U.S. and U.K. are free to make any modifications and store any combination of weapons required to intervene in a flare-up of global or regional proportion. But a situation more attractive to littoral nations--wherein external countries are dependent upon arrangements with powers in the area to obtain bunkering and limited support facilities--is the antithesis of an "unimpeded access" strategy which Mahan has instilled in every Western planner.

B. SUPERPOWER MOVEMENT: 1966-1973

Following the Exchange of Notes between Great Britain and the United States in December 1966, there was nearly a year of politico-military inactivity in the Indian Ocean. Aside from the commissioning of a U.S. communication station at the North West Cape in April 1967 (in pursuance of an agreement signed between the United States and Australia in 1963),[15] power balances within the region

remained stable. Mired in an escalating war in Vietnam, the U.S. could not economically or politically afford to apportion funds or forces to the Indian Ocean theatre. But the January 1968 announcement of the pending British withdrawal from East of Aden seemed almost like a catalyst for superpower naval activity, as Table One reveals.[16]

Table I. Number of ship-days accumulated by the U.S. and Soviet Navies, 1960-1973

	1960-67	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Soviet Navy	Nil	529	1,138	1,670	1,480	2,387	2,487
U.S. Navy	[800] ^a	[800]	[800]	872	858	990	1,410

^aApproximate number per year.

Within three months of the British announcement, the Soviet Union detached a small task force consisting of a Sverdlov-class cruiser, a guided-missile destroyer, a submarine and a Pevek-class oiler to visit ports in Aden, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and Somalia.[17] Following this March 1968 deployment, the Soviets maintained a continuous presence in the region while expanding their naval contingent to a squadron of three to five surface ships and two or three submarines by 1970. During the Bangladesh War in 1971 and the Middle East crisis in October 1973, the Soviets augmented their

naval forces--from four to twenty combatants in the first case, and from four to fourteen in the second.[18] Aside from these deviations, however, the average number of ships rarely exceeded eight.

The U.S. Navy, still embroiled in the Vietnamese conflict, only brought additional forces into the region during the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971 and the Middle East War in 1973. It was not until after 1 January 1972, when the operational area of the U.S. Seventh (Pacific) Fleet was extended into the Indian Ocean, and the Vietnam War was tapering down, that the pattern of U.S. deployments began to change.

After four years of inactivity, the U.S. decided to exercise its right of access to the British island of Diego Garcia on 15 December 1970. An agreement was reached with London to build a \$19 million naval communications station on the island for joint use.[19] As originally conceived, this station would close a gap in the worldwide military communications network between similar stations at Asmaj (Ethiopia) and the North West Cape (Australia), and provide a link with ships and aircraft transiting the Indian Ocean.

Concerned with the increasing presence of Soviet and American naval combatants in the region, and convinced that a U.S. facility not under regional control would motivate the Soviet Union to seek an autonomous base of its own,

regional powers were quick to condemn the joint venture. Speaking at the meeting of Commonwealth heads of government in Singapore on 21 January 1971, Mrs. Bandaranaike summarized the anxiety of littoral nations:

Until now...neither the United States of America nor the Soviet Union has had any bases on territories under their control in the Indian Ocean, for stockpiling of weapons or the conduct of dangerous operations in a moment of crisis. The substance of our position is that weapons attract weapons, and bases, whatever they may be called, will attract bases from the opposing parties. If either of the superpowers establishes a naval base in the Indian Ocean, it will only be a matter of time before the other follows suit. In this context, we feel that there is a world of difference between, for example, the British air base at Gan airfield in the Maldives, or the Indian and Pakistan military installations in their respective territories, and the base that Britain has agreed to place in Diego Garcia under the control of the United States of America.[20]

Addressing the U.N. General Assembly on 12 October 1971, Prime Minister Bandaranaike built upon her Singapore memorandum by proposing that the Indian Ocean be declared "a zone of peace" reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, with the following rules in force:

Within the zone no armaments of any kind, defensive or offensive, may be installed on or in the sea, on the subjacent sea bed or on land areas. Ships of all nations may exercise the right of transit but warships and ships carrying warlike equipment including submarines may not stop for other than emergency reasons of a technical, mechanical, or humanitarian nature. No maneuvers by warships of any State shall be permitted. Naval intelligence operations shall be forbidden. No weapon tests of any kind may be conducted, the regulatory system to be established will be under effective international control.[21]

Mrs. Bandaranaike realized that her proposal was incompatible with "customary and conventional international law which seeks to preserve the seas beyond territorial waters as open to all nations".[22] Based upon the response to her plan at the 1970 Lusaka Conference of Nonaligned Nations and at the Singapore Meeting in January, however, she thought that most nations agreed the principle of freedom of the high seas was unequally "weighted in favor of the interest of the dominant user nations" and that she would be able to force a modification of this principle "to accommodate the needs and realities of the world today."^[23]

The consensus of nonaligned nations did not extend to the entire body of the U.N. General Assembly, however, and the 1972 draft resolution met with a series of reservations. International law advocated freedom on the high seas for all ships and few were willing to back the effort of a group of states in any given region to "establish a separate legal regime for the high seas in that region."^[24] There was concern that restrictions on international commerce, fishing, installations of submarine cables and pipeline, or even overflights would arise. Other nations underscored the possible complications of verification. And there were protests that the proposal ignored bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements in the region, and thus encroached upon the sovereign rights of individual states.

After the Sri Lanka resolution was modified to conform with international law, the U.N. General Assembly adopted it on 16 December 1971 by a vote of 61 to 0, with 55 abstentions. The adopted version had two provisions: The first called on the great powers to consult with Indian Ocean littoral states in order to halt escalation of great power military presence in the area and to eliminate from the Indian Ocean "all bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities,...nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of Great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of Great Power rivalry." The second provision called for consultations among littoral and hinterland states, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and other major maritime nations to ensure that warships and military aircraft would not use the Indian Ocean in any manner which threatened the littoral and hinterland states. Subject to these restrictions and to the principles of international law, "the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected." [25]

Subsequent Indian Ocean zone of peace resolutions were passed each year with an increasing number of nations supporting the concept. But the votes of nuclear-weapon powers (those at whom the resolutions were directed) remained consistent with positions taken in 1973 (See Table II). [26]

Table II. Record of the nuclear-weapon powers' votes on
U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 3080 (Indian
Ocean as a zone of peace) 1973

China	France	USSR	UK	USA
Yes	Abstaining	Abstaining	Abstaining	Abstaining

Attempts by Ad Hoc Committees to define the boundaries of the zone and to construct a universally acceptable disarmament plan threatened the fragile consensus of the littoral nations. Thus little progress was made on the matter, and the resolution remained an innocuous policy that cost nothing to espouse or express sympathy with, that could mean many things to different people and countries, that could exist with apparently conflicting policies (i.e., bilateral security arrangements), and that was an accepted element in the nonaligned philosophy. What had become evident was that a stalemate had been reached which would only be broken when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. sat down and seriously negotiated bilateral naval force reductions in the Indian Ocean.

C. NALT AND SUPERPOWER BASES: 1973-1980

Following the completion of its Diego Garcia communication station in the spring of 1973, the United States signed a new agreement, announced in the British House of Commons on 5 February 1974, providing for the establishment of U.S. support installations on Diego Garcia for warships

and aircraft. Proposed U.S. plans included lengthening the airstrip from 8,000 to 12,000 feet; increasing the fuel storage capacity from 60,000 to 380,000 barrels of aviation fuel, and 320,000 barrels of fuel oil for ships; expanding the airfield parking area and adding a limited aircraft maintenance and repair facility; dredging the lagoon so it would be able to handle a dozen ships, rather than just two or three; and improving the existing quarters to accomodate over 600 personnel.[27]

Fulfillment of the plan would enable the U.S. to continuously operate a carrier task force in the Indian Ocean. The lengthened runway would be suitable for KC-135 refueling aircraft, strategic bombers, or the deployment of a long-range maritime patrol squadron.

After several months of debate, which included consideration of a unanimous policy statement opposing the construction of further facilities at Diego Garcia by 30 Indian Ocean states (signed 17 November 1974), the British Government agreed to the United States' proposals for facility expansion on 3 December 1974.

1. The Congressional Battle

Questions concerning the expansion of Diego Garcia had not confined themselves to London. Between 1973 and 1979, the President and the U.S. Senate battled continuously over the definition of U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean. The Senate refused to fund the Navy's expansion

plans in 1973, and gave approval in 1974 on the condition that the project be subject to only a one-house veto. In 1975 President Ford confirmed his intention to proceed with plans to upgrade the facility, but another obstacle was created 22 March when Senator Edward M. Kennedy submitted Senate Resolution 117 on behalf of himself, Senator Jacob Javits, and Senator Claiborne Pell. This resolution called on the President to postpone improvements on Diego Garcia until he had attempted direct negotiations with the Soviets aimed at achieving mutual limitations on facilities and force levels in the Indian Ocean.[28]

A subsequent amendment to the \$3.6 billion military construction bill by Senator John Culver withheld the \$13.6 million allotment for the Deigo Garcia facility until 1 July 1976, at which time the President was to report the status of negotiations with the Soviet Union in naval arms limitation talks for the Indian Ocean.[29] The delay in the release of these funds was later shortened when a House-Senate Conference on the Culver Amendment modified it by requiring the President to report on the status of talks with the Soviets by April 15.[30]

Senate Resolution 117 and the Culver Amendment represented the continuing momentum in Congress to curb overseas military forces and bases in the wake of the Vietnam war. In exercising "the power of the purse," the Culver Amendment reaffirmed the Senate's ability to

restrict Executive freedom by attaching riders to authorizing and appropriating bills.[31] More importantly, both acts highlighted Washington's fragmented foreign policy consensus. The containment doctrine had crumbled, and its replacement drifted amongst sentiment in favor of reducing the amount of U.S. political and military involvement with the rest of the world, voices stressing the possibilities of East-West detente in an "era of negotiations," and balance of power theorists seeking the modernization of America's strategic and conventional forces. Although the Senate never questioned America's need for free sealanes, and rejected the concept of special legal regimes in specific regions of the world,[32] it continued to question the national interest in modernizing Diego Garcia until long after Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency of the United States.

2. The Carter Initiative

President Carter brought an unorthodox open negotiating style to Washington which, when combined with a forceful stand on human rights and early Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) disagreements over the American cruise missile and the Soviet Backfire bomber, confused and angered the Soviet negotiating team. When Congressional criticism of Mr. Carter's foreign policies augmented that of the Soviets, the President sought to entice Moscow into an agreement on some less thorny issue than strategic arms

control to improve the negotiating atmosphere and demonstrate his administration's good faith. Several proposals were forwarded to the Soviets, including demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, a ban on arming satellites, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and advance notification of missile tests. Mr. Carter implied that these issues were those on which there was some accord and which could quickly result in agreement--thus paving the way for more difficult negotiations on strategic arms.[33]

Addressing the U.N. General Assembly on 17 March 1977, President Carter re-emphasized his interest in "mutual military restraint in the Indian Ocean." [34] He also mentioned the matter in his opening statement at a 24 March news conference.[35] The Soviets accepted Mr. Carter's challenge later the same day. Speaking in Tanzania, Soviet President Nokolai V. Podgorny indicated his country was prepared "to open talks with the United States and other concerned nations on the question of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace." Podgorny dampened hopes for a quick resolution, however, when he stated "the key question" in preserving peace in the area was "the elimination of imperialist bases".[36]

The stage was thus set for negotiations, but there was still some question of what was being sought by each side. Podgorny's reference to "imperialist bases" could refer to Diego Garcia, could be expanded to encompass U.S.

facilities in Bahrain and Australia, or could even encompass the British and French depots. While Podgorny was vague concerning what constituted an "imperialist base", he was very clear about Soviet facilities in Somalia--"the Soviet Union," he stated, "does not maintain any bases in the Indian Ocean or have any intention of establishing them." [37] In short, talks were necessary to determine the negotiating agenda and define the vocabulary of each negotiating team.

On 30 March, Mr. Carter reported that negotiations in Moscow between Secretary of State Vance and Soviet leaders had established a study group to "discuss terms by which we might demilitarize or reduce the military effort in the Indian Ocean." [38] Although the President implied a reduction, the American proposal at the first session was for "stabilizing" the presence of bases, ships and aircraft. The United States thereby avoided the question of what constituted a base and offered to freeze the status quo. Under this plan each side would be permitted to maintain its existing fleets and patterns of operation. The U.S. Navy could retain its expanded base on Diego Garcia, and in return, the Soviet Navy could continue using facilities at the Somali port of Berbera--including the air base, floating drydock and missile storage site. [39]

At first Moscow opposed the stabilization concept, because it still allowed the U.S. the flexibility to deploy

ballistic missile submarines and carrier-based aircraft into the region. But in the second round of talks in the fall of 1977, Moscow appeared ready to accept several elements of the freeze. At the U.N., Moscow indicated that a provisional agreement "freezing" the military activities in the area, if reached, should be followed by talks on a drastic reduction of military activities there, including the dismantling of foreign bases.[40] The U.S. agreed in principle, and toward the end of 1977, the two sides had virtually consented not to increase their force levels while working toward a reduction.[41]

3. The Break-Up of NALT

When Somalia's Said Barre ordered the July 1977 invasion of the Ogaden with Soviet-supplied weapons in pursuit of irredentist claims and against Moscow's wishes, the Soviet Union began to lose its grip on the Berbera facility. Soviet-Somali relations became progressively cooler when Moscow stepped up its aid to Ethiopia in late August and ceased arms deliveries to Somalia in mid-October. In November 1977, President Said Barre unilaterally abrogated the 1974 Soviet-Somali Friendship and Cooperation Treaty and expelled the Soviets from the country.[42]

Having lost its primary naval base in the Indian Ocean, the Soviets were no longer interested in an arrangement with the U.S. which froze the status quo, and they

said as much to the U.S. NALT team.[43] In the meantime, they sought a "bargaining chip" to replace Berbera. Their search first led them to existing bases which had been constructed by former colonial powers. They offered \$1 million to lease Gan, an island located 400 miles north of Diego Garcia, claiming the former British air base would only be used as a supply station for fishing vessels. Amir Ibrahim Nasir, President of the Maldives, was unconvinced, and rejected the Soviet bid in late 1977.[44] Soon afterward the Soviets tried to acquire Diego Suarez, a base that France had evacuated in northern Madagascar when the island became independent in 1975. Though heavily reliant on Soviet military advisors and plagued with tribal conflicts and widespread food shortages, President Didier Ratsiraka refused to relinquish the port's sovereignty to a foreign military power.[45]

Finding a substitute for Berbera for the purpose of resuming NAL negotiations, however, was only a secondary Soviet concern. Foremost in Moscow's political strategy was to avoid losing its new client, Ethiopia, and its geographic position between Africa and the Middle East.[46] Following the expulsion from Somalia, therefore, the Soviet Union began massive air- and sea-lifts of material to Ethiopia on 29 November. In order to airlift its supplies:

the Soviets found it necessary to employ a wide variety of flight routes, to abuse the Montreux Convention's provisions for overflights through Turkish air

corridors, to engage widely in such subterfuges as listing false final destinations and, on one occasion, to substitute military transports for the civilian aircraft for which overflight permission had been granted.[47]

Due to congestion at the port of Assab (Ethiopia) and vulnerable supply lines from Assab to the Ethiopian front, Moscow chose to use tank landing ships for sealift. These lightly armed vessels required surface escorts, and forced the Soviets to increase the number of their naval units to the highest level ever maintained in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, 13,000 Cuban troops were brought into Ethiopia to assume a direct role in the fighting.[48]

In light of these events, the U.S. Government, claiming that the Soviet naval buildup at the height of the war cast doubt upon Moscow's sincerity and interest in Indian Ocean naval limitations, suspended the talks after the fourth round in February 1978.[49] At this final negotiating session, Paul Warnke, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. Delegation, told Moscow that subsequent negotiations would be linked to Soviet actions on the Horn of Africa.[50]

Following the suspension of the naval arms limitation talks, both superpowers stepped up their activities in the Indian Ocean. In March 1978, the Cubans continued their offensive against the Somalis in the Ogaden, while the Soviets reluctantly joined the Ethiopians in quelling the guerrillas in Eritrea. Moscow also brought about 2,000

advisors and technicians into the Horn from other East European countries to assist in the military and ideological training of the police, militia, regular armed forces and youth groups. The presence of these personnel from the Warsaw Pact nations of East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia contributed to Moscow's attempt to demonstrate "international" support for the Ethiopian struggle.[51]

In June 1978, Moscow became the beneficiary of a coup in South Yemen after efforts to enlarge lines of communication with Washington and Beijing triggered a takeover by a pro-Moscow faction of its Marxist government.[52] With the return of a measure of stability to Ethiopia and the windfall in Aden, the Soviets more or less made up for their loss in Somalia through access to support facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. The Soviet Indian Ocean squadron gained access to facilities at Socotra, a South Yemeni island in the Arabian Sea, and began building up bases on Perim and the Dahlak Archipelago--islands belonging to Ethiopia. Subsequent transfer of a floating drydock from Aden to Dahlak Island has enabled the Soviets to convert this site into a major ship repair facility.[53]

In July 1978, Moscow obtained access to facilities in Cam Rahn Bay following a Sino-Vietnamese split on Kampuchean policy. This access, while limited, is particularly important to the Soviets, because it is the only port

available for forward basing between Vladivostok and the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, Cam Rahn Bay's position enables the Soviets to monitor traffic transiting through the South China Sea.

On 27 December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in order to prop up the last vestiges of a pro-Moscow leadership in Kabul. While the ultimate intentions of Moscow in this country still remain unclear, Soviet control of Afghanistan's airfields and aviation facilities enables the Soviets to counter-balance the air power of U.S. carrier task forces deployed in the Indian Ocean.

The U.S., for its part, has moved ahead with improvement of Diego Garcia and construction of a Rapid Deployment Force which can be deployed to the Persian Gulf on two-weeks' notice. After the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in January 1979, the U.S. sought to broaden its support of regional powers, particularly the "regional influentials," National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's term for those nations in the process of acquiring considerable power which might be relied upon to resist Soviet advances.[54] These countries include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Australia.

The U.S. also strengthened its ties with China. Although many of their policies are diametrically opposed, Western and Chinese interests intersect on checking Soviet support for particular guerrilla groups in southern Africa,

providing Pakistan with help against possible pressure from Soviet-supported Afghanistan and blocking the emergence of an Indochina dominated by a Moscow-backed Vietnam.[55]

In addition, assistance and cooperation agreements involving American use of bases have recently been signed with Australia, Bahrain, Kenya, Somalia and Oman; while Egypt, Sudan and Israel, with access to the Red Sea, have declared their readiness to let American forces use bases under certain circumstances.[56] Should U.S. forces be deployed to the Sinai in the near future to fulfill Camp David peace-keeping functions, the U.S. stands to gain access to even more tangible assets in Southwest Asia.

Even as the two superpowers were negotiating new base rights and improving their abilities to project and sustain forces in the Indian Ocean, the Carter Administration sought to lessen competition through communication. Testifying before a House Armed Services Committee panel in October 1978, Leslie H. Gelb, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, indicated that Soviet naval forces had returned to routine levels and that the administration was considering whether to resume the Indian Ocean negotiations broken off in February. Gelb said the subject had been broached in discussions between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Minister Andrei Gromyko during the latter's visit to New York in August. Gelb went on to assure House members that American

interests--defined as protecting the oil lifeline, guarding U.S. friends in the area, and conveying an appreciation of the growing economic potential of countries in the region--would not be jeopardized by the stabilization agreement. The arrangement, he said, would still

...permit periodic deployments of U.S. Navy task forces in the Indian Ocean; maintain a Navy facility at Diego Garcia,...allow participation in joint military exercises with allied forces in the region, and allow both routine transit and port calls in countries of the Indian Ocean littoral.[57]

Between October 1978 and May 1979, however, the Indian Ocean negotiations were pre-empted by the talks they had originally been designed to facilitate--SALT II. Despite solicitations from Asian and African nations for the resumption of demilitarization negotiations between the two superpowers, it was not until May 1979, when the SALT II agreements were completed, that the U.S. was again able to focus attention on NALT. The topic was placed on the agenda for June, during the Brezhnev-Carter summit in Vienna to sign the SALT II treaty.[58]

But prior to the June summit the Administration failed to gain a consensus to continue talks. Sharp divisions had arisen within the Carter Administration regarding the benefits of a naval agreement with Moscow while over 10,000 Cuban troops and 1,000 Soviet and East German advisors remained in Ethiopia. The Soviets had consolidated relations with Addis Ababa by concluding a Friendship and

Cooperation treaty 20 November 1978 which included a call for consistent policies opposing U.S. expansionism, thereby having clear anti-Somali overtones.[59] The domestic situations in Afghanistan and Iran were also causes for concern. Instability in Afghanistan had led to the death of the American Ambassador in February 1979--the same month that armed guerrillas attacked the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held Ambassador Sullivan and 100 staff members hostage for two hours--and suspicion of Soviet aspirations within the region was building.

Outside the Carter Administration, the climate of distrust was even more pronounced. Foreign policy analysts, members of Congress and the Senate, and Pentagon spokesmen were joining ranks to challenge Mr. Carter's ability to negotiate with the Soviet Union. The President's refusal to react to the continuing Soviet and Cuban activities in Angola, a hands-off attitude during the Horn of Africa conflict, and retreat on the issue of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba brought foreign policy critics together with military interests which questioned the President's cancellation of the B-1 bomber, veto of a new attack carrier, decision not to build the neutron bomb (after pressuring European leaders to publicly accept it at some cost in terms of their own political standing), and concessions on a whole host of issues connected with the SALT II agreements.[60]

Besieged by such criticism, the President concentrated upon ushering the SALT II accords through Congress. Over the objections of nonaligned nations in the Indian Ocean, further naval arms limitation talks were tabled, and remained there through the completion of Mr. Carter's term in office. Any Administration hopes of reviving the issue were abandoned after the November 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the December invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Instead, the Administration struggled to avoid being overwhelmed by events which seemed beyond control. Despite diplomatic pleas, legal admonishment, economic coercion, and the deployment of three aircraft carrier task forces to the Indian Ocean, the hostages were not released. Similarly, almost unanimous condemnation in the U.N. General Assembly and a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow notwithstanding, the Soviets remained in Afghanistan. If anything, the area grew even more bellicose in September 1980 when Iraqi troops stormed into Iran to renew Baghdad's claim of the Shatt-al-Arab River and to respond to Iranian calls for rebellion by Iraq's Shi'i majority.

An environment had emerged wherein further negotiations with the Soviets to create a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean became certain political suicide. And Jimmy Carter, no longer backed by the advocates of detente who

had flourished in Washington four years earlier, chose to let the issue die a silent death.

D. ADDITIONAL DELAYS AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: 1981

Testifying before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs on 23 March 1981, Richard Burt, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, described the prospects for arms control initiatives as dismal. Pointing to the ongoing occupation of Afghanistan, Burt stated: "for the foreseeable future the Soviets are not prepared to negotiate arms control measures for the Indian Ocean area in good faith."^[61] Multilateral efforts under the auspices of the U.N., he went on, were even less likely of success than bilateral negotiations:

Some regional states want to exclude the superpowers; [62] others want to ensure that their stronger regional neighbors are never in a position to dominate them.

But Burt assured the subcommittee the U.S. would continue to work with the U.N.'s Ad Hoc Committee to define a set of principles for the Indian Ocean region on which all could agree.

Burt's testimony, however, only indicates some of problems surrounding multilateral progress. In February 1980, for instance, the Soviets pushed for the admission of the GDR, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia to the Committee on the Indian Ocean. When this was blocked by

the United States and several other NATO countries, the Soviets sought their admission on the ground that they made "extensive use of the waters of the Indian Ocean" and wanted "to make their contribution to the turning of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace." [63]

Tension also arose in 1981 when, focusing upon the occupation of Afghanistan, the U.S., its allies, and China opposed plans to convene the 1981 Colombo conference. During the discussion the U.S. noted a large build-up of Soviet forces in Soviet Central Asia. Nonetheless, at the February-March session in New York, the nonaligned nations proposed holding an August conference in Colombo and submitted a draft agenda. Their outline included a discussion of the political situation in the Indian Ocean region, the principles and aspects of the problem and a series of steps to transform the region into a zone of peace. As a concession to Soviet objections, the non-aligned nations dropped the subject of "rivalry between the great powers" from the program. [64] Moscow, which has always demanded that a distinction be made between the Soviet Union's objectives in the region and those of the imperialist powers, was satisfied; but Western representatives were not. The latter stated again that as long as Soviet forces remained in Afghanistan, the atmosphere was not conducive for a multilateral conference. Sri Lanka's representative and chairman of the committee, Nadarajah Balasubramaniam,

concurred, stating that the conference would "merely be a forum for propaganda while Soviet forces remain in Afghanistan and revolutionary uncertainty holds sway in Iran.[65]

In June 1981 these polemics continued. U.S. delegate Philip Wilcox labeled Soviet descriptions of an American naval threat as an attempt to divert attention from Moscow's occupation of Afghanistan. Australia's Perry Nolan agreed, and added that Soviet support for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was equally destabilizing and fostered further suspicion of Moscow's strategic motives. The Western view was summarized in West Germany's draft resolution, which again recommended an indefinite delay "until the region's political and security climate is more propitious."[66]

Opposing Western appeals for delay, the Soviet Union focused on the two U.S. aircraft carrier task forces and improvements to the Diego Garcia complex. Soviet representative Lev Mendelevich emphasized Moscow's intention to respond to threats to its security, and to compete as an equal superpower in every region of the world, including the Indian Ocean.[67]

In an attempt to side-step East-West friction, Abdul Halim of Malaysia offered the nonaligned nations' three-point plan for achieving a zone of peace within the region.

- (1) The withdrawal of all foreign forces;
- (2) Agreement among the region's states that they will settle disputes peacefully, and
- (3) An understanding between the regional states and the big powers that the latter will not use force against the former and that the Indian Ocean countries will not invite foreign military intervention.[68]

The final outcome of the June conference, however, was the cancellation of the international congress scheduled to take place on Colombo in the summer of 1981. Though plans are still tentative, the conference has now been pushed back to mid-1983. Two meetings have been proposed in 1982 to plan the conference and prepare a report to the U.N. General Assembly conference on disarmament. But the underlying schisms which caused the 1981 postponement remain, and hopes for consensus on a future conference, much less a settlement on creating a regional zone of peace, appear ambitious indeed.

III. THE SOVIET PRESENCE

In the international section of Leonid Brezhnev's February 1981 address to the 26th Party Congress, the General Secretary gave undisputed priority to the peace issue. In particular, Mr. Brezhnev proposed a Soviet-American summit, a moratorium on the introduction of new theatre nuclear weapons in Europe, and the creation of zones of peace, especially in the Indian Ocean.[1] This chapter will examine the last issue, Soviet interests in the region, Moscow's motivations for favoring such a proposal, and other Soviet initiatives in the Asian theatre. Differences between Moscow's peace zone formula and the U.N. General Assembly resolution will be noted, along with the effects of either proposal on the West's ability to protect its interests in the Indian Ocean. Finally, this chapter will demonstrate that Moscow desires to place the responsibility for failures to reach a settlement squarely on the shoulders of the U.S., and thus enhance its image as an advocate of regional causes.

A. SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

In August 1981, an article in Moscow's International Affairs by A. Ladozhsky outlined several Soviet national interests in the Indian Ocean:

First of all, the U.S.S.R has a stake in preventing the appearance of a strategic threat to it from the southern direction. It is no secret that dozens of planes based on American aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf have a wide range of operation and can carry nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, just as all littoral and hinterland countries, is interested in the safety of sea routes passing through the Indian Ocean because they not only link the U.S.S.R. with the littoral states but are also the only year-round sea route linking the European part of the U.S.S.R. with its Far Eastern ports.

In that area the U.S.S.R. conducts important work connected with space exploration and is also engaged in research which is a part of its study of the World Ocean.

In addition, the Soviet Union also has political interests in the Indian Ocean area where there are dozens of states which have recently become free from colonial domination. The U.S.S.R. supported the peoples of these countries in their struggle for independence. It supports them now, too, in their struggle against imperialism, hegemonism, neo-colonialism and racism (emphasis mine).[2]

Ladzhsky's article is remarkable because it stresses concerns which are common to the Soviet Union and the littoral states. An April 1981 interview[3] was less cautious in its approach. At that time, Yuri Velikano, a diplomat in the Seychelles, emphasized Moscow's desire to secure its "own maritime and fishing areas", support African "liberation movements", and protect itself against U.S. ballistic missile submarines.

Ladzhsky fails to mention self-serving pursuits such as Soviet fishing, which has caused some friction within the region over the past decade. Instead, he attempts to place the Soviet Union squarely in the littoral camp:

Two lines are clearly seen in the discussion of the question of the peace zone in the Indian Ocean. The

Soviet Union favours a decision that would promote peace and security, and the interests not only of the U.S.S.R. but also of the countries of the Indian Ocean. The United States on the other hand, having declared this area a "sphere of its vital interests," is pursuing a line that is diametrically opposed to the very concept of the peace zone (emphasis mine). [4]

The change in Soviet rhetoric is due to increasing criticism from many of the littoral powers about great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. These states rarely make any distinction between non-littoral intruders--a situation which clearly disturbs Moscow, and which has led to a propaganda barrage against such comparisons. Yet Ladozhsky's list, because of its "united front" approach, neglects to mention other important reasons for the Soviet naval presence. I have therefore chosen to summarize the economic, political and military interests of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, and have briefly commented, where necessary, on how the Soviet naval presence relates to each:

- (1) Gaining experience of sailing in distant waters under different climatic conditions and training in escorting cargo ships--a legitimate function of all navies. This training includes command, control and communications (C³) testing, hydrographic research, and bathymetric mapping.
- (2) Indian Ocean fishing. Fish products provide one third of the animal protein in the Soviet diet and one fifth of all protein. A naval presence deters the seizure or harassment of Soviet trawlers.
- (3) Seaborne support of various space events.
- (4) A sea route through the Indian Ocean for the movement of goods between the east and west coasts of the U.S.S.R. The Trans-Siberian railroad

reached its saturation point in 1972 (when the Suez was closed) and a second overland system--the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railway--is not yet complete. The northern sea route through the Arctic Ocean is only open a few months of the year.

- (5) Observation of, or influence in, prospective political and military changes in the Persian Gulf, a body of water that lies close to Russian missile and outer space industries located in Central Asia.
- (6) Interest in oil and other minerals adjacent to or underneath parts of the Indian Ocean. In particular, the Soviets seek an equal opportunity to exploit these resources and to compete for offshore concessions from littoral states.
- (7) Deterring the presence of Polaris, Poseidon, or Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile operations in the Arabian Sea.
- (8) Gaining a foothold in the area by taking advantage of the West's mistakes, or, at a minimum, preventing the West from exercising unfettered influence in the area. This includes naval demonstrations to prove that Moscow must be consulted in crises, while (by having no permanent "bases" and no large permanent combatant presence) avoiding the political and economic costs generally associated with regional deployments.
- (9) Preparing for the advent of Chinese ballistic missiles, aboard naval ships or submarines, aimed at the Soviet Union.
- (10) Economic and political advertisement of advanced socialist technology and the success of the Soviet socialist system.
- (11) Providing arms, technicians, and advisors to local governments. A naval presence can support arms transfers and serves to insure the safety of Soviet citizens acting in advisory roles.
- (12) Providing Soviet protection. A Soviet "umbrella" fosters greater self-defense and can augment defense against China in India, Southeast Asia, and Africa.

One of the most contentious articles from this list is the threat posed by submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Soviets frequently mention the ability of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missiles to strike the Soviet Union from the Indian Ocean, and even go so far as to exaggerate the ranges of these weapons. Yuri Velikanov, in his April interview, for instance, stated that U.S. "missiles from submarines in this ocean can reach any part of the Soviet Union".[5] Clearly, the Polaris (2,500 nautical miles) and Poseidon (2,880 nautical miles) do not have this range. But the mention of this capability has often been translated into American use of this ocean for its ballistic missile submarine fleet by the littoral nations.

To date, Washington has never admitted such a deployment and Moscow has never accused the U.S. of posing such a threat--only in having the capability.[6] Indeed, the lack of submarine tender, navigation, and communications support in the Indian Ocean, as well as the amount of time required to transit from the submarine base in Guam to an area in the ocean that would place Soviet targets within range of SLBMs makes Soviet rhetoric seem ludicrous.[7] One explanation for Moscow's continuous emphasis on strategic capabilities is that it constitutes a warning:

I do not think we can entirely dismiss Soviet anxieties on this score as dissimulation to justify their own presence. They may well be legitimate. It

is even possible that their present relatively modest deployment in the Indian Ocean was in part intended as an earnest to the United States that if we did initiate regular patrols, the competition would be hot and heavy. If so, we should take them at their word. There is probably no easier way to get Russian ships steaming all over the Indian Ocean than to introduce a strategic threat.[8]

As in the past, however, there is no incentive to place U.S. SLBMs in the Indian Ocean at a future date. The range of the Poseidon missile precludes its future deployment into the region. Only the 4,000-mile range Trident missile, would make such deployment feasible. The 1975 SIPRI Yearbook, in fact, goes so far as to proclaim that the "U.S. Navy now intends to deploy ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean more frequently in the future as vessels equipped with somewhat longer-range missiles than those carried by earlier versions enter service." [9] The SIPRI Yearbook gave no source for this declaration, however, and made no effort to explain why newer-generation submarines would want to nullify their longer ranges with trips around South Africa or Australia--trips which would take them outside of effective firing range. In short, though a future deployment of SLBM platforms would evoke a Soviet response, this is not the reason for present Soviet levels in the Indian Ocean.

B. MOTIVATIONS FOR FAVORING A ZONE OF PEACE

The main reason the Soviet Navy is present in the region is because other non-littoral navies are present. A

review of the list of Soviet interests in the area will reveal every one could be fulfilled with passage of a zone of peace resolution which respected the Law of the Sea agreements. Ladozhsky acknowledged this fact in his International Relations article:

The Soviet Union does not have any interests or aims in the region that would necessitate its military presence, but this presupposes mutuality on the part of other non-littoral states.[10]

This statement underscores what several Americans have been saying for years. In his 1979 work on the Soviet Navy, for instance, Robert Bathurst wrote:

The Soviets are not obviously changing the correlation of forces in the Indian Ocean, for the price is to be able to strike at industrial Europe and Japan through the weakest link, oil. As these goals can be achieved more easily through the air and by land, however, it is likely that the Soviet Navy will not have a major role here.[11]

Testifying before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs in March 1981, Richard Burt reiterated this theme when questioned about Moscow's position on Indian Ocean arms limitation talks:

On the superpower level, Soviet arms control initiatives apply only to naval forces. This would do a good job of limiting U.S. military presence in the region--since the preponderance of our forces are naval--while leaving the massive Soviet land presence, Afghanistan, and Soviet military involvement in and assistance to regional states completely out of the picture.[12]

What both of these men are saying, and what is clear when one analyzes Soviet statements about the "zone of peace" is that Moscow would prefer not to have to maintain an

armada within the Indian Ocean. A large naval presence in the Indian Ocean is expensive to maintain, difficult to service and vulnerable in wartime. Reinforcements from Pacific ports have to travel thousands of miles along unfriendly coastlines, while ships from the Black, Baltic and North Seas transit long routes through narrow straits and canals.

The U.S. faces an equally challenging problem but has no other options. Although this is changing as the U.S. acquires the use of air and land facilities in some littoral nations, the U.S. Navy still remains the predominant means of guaranteeing the security of regional sea lanes.

Historically, the Soviet Union has been trying since 1955 to break through the Western cordon in South Asia. By 1964 it had succeeded in making its political presence felt in almost all the Indian Ocean states, but the Soviets lacked naval power in the area, even on the eve of the U.S. task force entry in 1964.

Probably the U.S.S.R., till that time, thought that the Indian Ocean did not pose a strategic nuclear threat to its security. And, even if the U.S.S.R. was aware of that threat, inadequate naval capacity prevented the U.S.S.R. from operating a naval fleet in the Indian Ocean at the time.[13]

Soviet naval capacity increased gradually, and its presence on the high seas was also gradual. As oilers, supply vessels and more modern, powerful, ocean-going ships were added to the fleet in the 1960's, the Soviets began to

operate in the Baltic, the North Sea and the Atlantic, and then gradually made their presence felt in the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean.[14] The first Soviet deployment to the Indian Ocean was not until 1968.

In 1981 the Soviet Union maintained 21 ships in the Indian Ocean, and most of these were noncombatants not equitable to the two aircraft carrier task forces the United States deployed to the area following the invasion of Afghanistan.[15] Up until the withdrawal of one carrier task force in November 1981, the U.S. Navy maintained nearly 32 combat and support vessels in the region.[16] In November this was reduced to 25 U.S. ships. As was demonstrated in the course of the American hostage crisis from 1979-1981, however, naval power has limited applications when not employed in concert with ground and air forces. Even when all military forces are combined, there are nationalist, cultural, political and economic factors to be overcome, as the United States learned in Vietnam, and the Soviets are learning in Afghanistan.

Thus, with or without a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union will still have the ability to bring the onus of its military forces to bear upon the region. By affirming its readiness to negotiate naval force reductions, the U.S.S.R. is attempting to gain the support of the nonaligned movement to bring the U.S. to the bargaining table. The Soviets realize that the U.S. is

clearly in a no-win situation; whether America agrees to a freeze, a reduction of its presence or the elimination of bases, it would be negotiating away its ability to deter Moscow's military pressure on the region.

The Soviet approach to making the Indian Ocean into a "zone of peace" is consistent with Soviet negotiations on arms limitations in other areas, including strategic weapons, theatre nuclear weapons, and mutual-balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe. Speaking before the 31st U.N. General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stated:

We consider it reasonable that a number of Asian and African states desire to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. In this connection, the essential point is that there should be no foreign military bases in the area which constitute the main element of a permanent military presence. As for the Soviet Union, it has never had and does not have any intention of building military bases in the Indian Ocean.

In solving the problem of foreign military bases along these lines, the Soviet Union is prepared, together with other Powers, to seek ways of reducing on a reciprocal basis the military activities of non-coastal States in the Indian Ocean and the regions directly adjacent thereto. Our country has shown its readiness to contribute to the realization of the idea of turning it into a zone of peace, but of course, this should not create any obstacles to the freedom of navigation or scientific research in the Indian Ocean. If due account is taken of our approach by the States concerned, the Soviet Union will be able to participate in consultations on matters relating to preparations for convening an international conference on the Indian Ocean.[17]

Mr. Gromyko's 1976 speech begins by supporting the gist of the nonaligned nations' proposal, but is quick to add the

Soviet view of where the real problem lies--i.e. "foreign military bases which constitute the main element of a permanent military presence." This same point was made when President Podgorny, speaking in Tanzania on 24 March 1977, said "the key question of preserving peace...is the elimination of...imperialist military bases." [18] Each of these speakers subsequently went to great pains to emphasize that no Soviet facility in the Indian Ocean could be classified as a military base; that the Soviets were simply visiting littoral-nation ports at the invitation of host-country governments.

Although the attempt to clarify just what constitutes a "base" appears moot, it is an important part of the Soviet attempt to place the greater portion of regional political pressure upon the U.S. The Soviets realize that sponsors of the zone of peace movement, if forced to choose which situation they find most distasteful--bases under the control of littoral nations or bases which represent independent sovereign territory--will find the second condition least acceptable. After establishing Diego Garcia as a non-littoral facility, the Soviets feel free to declare geographical privilege because of a special moral status.

The second half of Mr. Gromyko's 1976 speech further illustrates the quasi-legal nature of the Soviet negotiating style. Although the Soviets support the zone of

peace concept, there are certain amendments which must be made. These include "freedom of navigation" and "scientific research". In essence, the Soviets are placing conditions on what would constitute an acceptable zone of peace proposal and their riders are little different from those sought by Western powers--that is, any zone of peace legislation must allow the free passage of all ships as guaranteed in the Law of the Sea Conference. Only when "due account" of the Soviet position is taken will the Soviets be willing to consider an agreement with littoral nations.

In short, the Soviet Union is attempting to focus the national and regional energies of littoral nations upon the one area of Soviet-Nonalignment agreement: the unsatisfactory presence of the American base on Diego Garcia. Once the Soviets dislodge the U.S. from Diego Garcia and restrict the size of future U.S. naval contingents, the zone of peace process is of limited utility. For this reason, one can expect continued absents by the Soviets whenever the resolution comes to a vote in the U.N.

C. OTHER SOVIET INITIATIVES IN ASIA

It would be short-sighted, however, to view the Indian Ocean aspirations of the Soviet Union merely in terms of a single U.N. resolution. Soviet sympathy for the zone of peace is closely entwined with Leonid Brezhnev's proposal

for "a system of collective security in Asia,"[19] made in his address to the International Meeting of Communist and Worker's Parties at Moscow on 7 June 1969. As stated in a 1979 editorial in the Moscow weekly New Times entitled "Asia Needs Security":

The U.S.S.R. views with understanding the idea, as advanced by the countries in the region, that their homeland should be made into a zone of peace...To realize this idea, a collective quest for constructive measures that would guarantee security, as well as concerted action by the countries concerned, is needed.[20]

The objective of this collective security system includes promoting the Soviet Union as an Asian power, and, in turn, selling itself as a protector of nationalist aspirations in the region. But Soviet support of the collective security plan, like the zone of peace proposals, serves Soviet interests first. It is part of a security package aimed solely at reducing the forces on or near its borders: first by eliminating the U.S. presence; second, by isolating other potential rivals (such as China); third, by engaging in bilateral security pledges, and fourth, by encouraging nonalignment when other options fail.

In the case of Soviet policy in South Asia, the Soviets have promoted their country as an Asian nation,[21] in tune with the aspirations of the regional states, and able to serve regional interests better than the U.S. But attempts to seek "regional solutions" are little more than proposals to exclude American and Western European presence. The

Chinese, who can also claim Asian standing, have been diplomatically isolated by Soviet exclusion from the Asian collective system, and through a system of bilateral Soviet treaties with Afghanistan, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, India, Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria. When bilateral treaties prove beyond the reach of the Soviets, then they prefer a state of nonalignment. Countries that sign agreements with "non-regional" powers often find themselves reminded of earlier Soviet pacts--as Izvestia reminded its readers in 1978 that the Soviet-Iran Treaty of 1921, which permits Russian intervention under certain circumstances, was still valid.[22]

In addition to the system of collective security in Asia, the zone of peace resolution is part of an ongoing competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for global parity. Whether or not the Soviet Union wishes to deploy naval forces to the Indian Ocean, the U.S. presence there mandates a Soviet response. Vernon Aspaturian has described this compulsion in terms of the Soviet quest to be seen as a global equal with the U.S. in all aspects:

No state is entitled to be a global power...global status...must be self-achieved, self-asserted, and self-sustained. Likewise, no state is entitled to be equal with any other state...equality, as even Soviet observers implicitly concede, is ascriptive in character and depends upon the recognition and policies of others.[23]

Thus, while Washington perceived the SALT I agreements as instruments designed to domesticate and contain Soviet

power; the Soviets perceived it as a step up to global equality with the U.S. Today the Soviets view U.S. "lectures" on their behavior in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and Vietnam as a refusal to treat the U.S.S.R. as an equal. Moscow believes itself forced to respond to U.S. deployments in the Indian Ocean to ensure its standing as an equal power, even if its political interests are better served by land and air forces. The Soviets, one could say, find themselves in a "double bind" situation: although aware of the fear expressed by littoral and oil-dependent nations about their presence in the Indian Ocean, Moscow is compelled to maintain a naval force in the region as long as an American naval challenge exists. Failure to answer the American presence (or conversely, American failure to match the Soviet presence), would jeopardize superpower standing.

In summarizing the Soviet position in the Indian Ocean, then, one can quote some of the same conclusions from studies analyzing Soviet negotiations in Europe.

Soviet security is now assured by a costly effort to maintain supremacy against all the U.S.S.R.'s neighbors, as well as parity with the U.S. Over the long term, however, Soviet security and the advance of socialism would be better served by the establishment of "peace zones" on the entire periphery of the U.S.S.R.[24]

The Soviets' long-term interest is not served by a large presence in the Indian Ocean if a negotiated reduction would lead to the elimination of American forces on

its southern perimeter. The Soviets will therefore continue to press the U.S. to engage in Naval Arms Limitations Talks, while coincidentally insisting on their inherent right of "free passage" and "scientific research" within the region. Although the Soviets recognize the political gains from expressing support of the zone of peace proposal, Moscow certainly intends to modify and apply the concept to suit its own purposes. Removal of non-littoral powers and greater independence for regional states is welcomed by Moscow--but only as long as nations gravitate away from the West and toward a system of collective security in Asia.

IV. THE INDIAN POSITION

The history of United States foreign policy in South Asia since partition of the subcontinent in 1947 has reflected, among other things, an aversion to Indian nationalism and stubborn adherence to the policy of containment. Today, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah of Iran, the U.S. finds itself again scrambling for a security system similar to the Baghdad Pact, the Central Treaty Organization or even the Iran-Saudi Arabia "twin pillar" arrangement. Reviving Dulles' East-West approach to the region, the Reagan Administration has chosen a strategy which moves the "second pillar" from Tehran to Islamabad and reignites the spectre in New Delhi of yet another challenge to Indian primacy on the subcontinent.

Understanding the failure of American policymakers to adopt a more sophisticated multilateral approach, which is better attuned to the political, economic and national aspirations of regional powers and which defines "security" in other than simply military terms, is best undertaken by a review of traditional great power-lesser power relationships. George Liska, in a paper on the Third World, mentions three courses available in great power-middle power intercourse:

- (1) Great powers can treat and have reasons to treat individual middle powers as regional rivals, and be led to help still lesser states to contain them under the pretense of restraining, unilaterally or cooperatively, all Third World conflict; or
- (2) They can regard them as regional allies in contests with other great powers and proceed to reinforce them competitively, possibly as a means to reapportionment by way of reclientization; and
- (3) Finally, they can proceed either unilaterally or jointly progressively to devolve regional responsibilities to apparently constructively disposed middle powers.[1]

Referring to Liska's list, Rouhollah Ramazani[2] has noted that the great powers have traditionally followed a combination of options 1 and 2 in their relations with regional powers in the Indian Ocean. Following World War II, the emergence of a rigid bipolar world based on competition and denial made the superpowers likely to characterize regional powers as "pro-Western" or "anti-Western" and fostered distrust of nonaligned nations which characterized themselves as autonomous. This simplistic bipolar view of global relationships lead the U.S. to make equally naive judgements concerning its alliance partners. A nation which entered a pro-Western alliance, such as CENTO, was considered an American "friend," acting in the interest of American ideology (containment), and not in pursuit of narrow national goals. The U.S. and its regional alliance partners, however, sometimes had different interpretations of what constituted a threat. Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) in order to achieve military parity with

India, not due to an incipient fear of communist hegemony. Conversely, India sought to consolidate domestic factions and pursue its destiny as an autonomous regional power, and avoided military involvement with the U.S. until the 1962 border clashes with China. Through its own bipolar glasses, the U.S. only saw these two South Asian powers as proxy forces capable of deterring Moscow and Peking:

The consistent strand running through the many twists and turns of U.S. South Asian policy has been an implicit view of both India and Pakistan as pawns in the great power game. In the thinking of many American officials, it was for the United States to decide whether and how to utilize them for American purposes or to checkmate their use by others. Thus, in the Nixon attitude so widespread in 1954, cold war priorities dictated strengthening Pakistan and weakening India. Later, the objective shifted to strengthening both India and Pakistan against China, preserving an American-determined balance between them for the sake of their common confrontation with Peking. Finally, during the Bangladesh crisis,... Pakistan was seen for all practical purposes as China's pawn and India as the Soviet Union's, with the American interest limited to making certain that neither Peking nor Moscow had a "destabilizing" monopoly of influence in the subcontinent. The power of nationalism in both South Asian countries was consistently underrated, in this perspective, and the ability of the external powers to manipulate regional power relationships consistently exaggerated.[3]

In short, the U.S. has consistently adhered to a policy of containment while employing Liska's first two options for great power-middle power relations. Rather than fostering India's quest for regional power status and devolving regional responsibilities which America inherited in the wake of colonial retreat from the area after World War II, America has clung tenaciously to a view of itself

as the stabilizing force in the balance of power game, filling a void which it believes regional powers neither wish nor are able to fill. Rather than reviewing the recommendations of leaders such as General Stilwell, studying the White Paper on China, or analyzing the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam, America continues to promote offensive paternalist policies of military, economic and political dependence in the Third World, when political and economic integration into an interdependent world order would represent a more effective long-term alternative. Strong economic and political powers, whose leaders govern with the approval of their citizenry, represent the best deterrence to the spread of communism, and ultimately the best means of "containment." Had U.S. policymakers of the 40's and 50's encouraged the transitional devolvement of regional responsibilities to the littoral powers of the Indian Ocean, rather than the divisive policies it promoted instead, the security of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf regions might very well be stronger today. And, one might add, the tragedies in China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and the Indian subcontinent--to name but a few instances--might never have occurred. It is with this history in mind that the chapter now turns to the foreign policy objectives of India, how they have shaped India's relationship with the Soviet Union, and what they imply for the future of the Indian Ocean region.

In a 1979 work on Soviet-Indian relations, Robert Donaldson outlined India's five major foreign policy objectives:

- (1) security from external military threat;
- (2) secure independence, maintain nonalignment, and avoid undue dependence on any one outside power;
- (3) insulate the Indian Ocean from great power military activity;
- (4) promote the maintenance of friendly (preferably democratic) governments, free of outside domination, in neighboring states; and
- (5) receive material assistance on the most favorable terms for economic development.[4]

In the following pages, my intent is to examine each of these objectives and to note the degree of success (or failure) India has had in meeting them. I shall also note, where appropriate, the part that the Soviet Union plays in promoting or preventing India's successful attainment of these goals, and how the zone of peace resolution relates to each.

A. SECURITY FROM EXTERNAL MILITARY THREAT

The highest priority of any nation is survival. India perceives threats to her political, military, economic and social well-being originating, unilaterally or simultaneously, from Pakistan and China. The succession of Bangladesh and the subsequent defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 war reduced most of the threat to India from her western neighbor. Through diplomatic initiatives and a

preponderance of military force, India seeks to discourage further Indo-Pakistani strife. India's diplomatic goals include deterring military aid to Islamabad from Beijing, Washington and other Islamic nations while preserving her security relationship with Moscow. The latter, formally transcribed in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty,[5] is the bulwark of India's defense against nuclear, conventional and guerrilla threats from China.

In addition to international recognition of her regional primacy and territorial sovereignty, India seeks to guarantee her access to foreign military technology and weaponry until domestic manufacture is deemed sufficient. Ideally, India would prefer to meet her defense needs with conventional arms. Pragmatically, barring a disarmament breakthrough, India will be forced to develop her own nuclear deterrent to insure self-sufficiency in all defense matters. This would prove all the more compelling were Pakistan to become a nuclear power.

National views differ between the Indians and the Soviets on how to best achieve security from external military threats, and these differences have the greatest potential of arousing suspicion and fracturing their close relationship. As a nonaligned nation, India seeks to maximize its foreign policy freedom, to balance its relations between the Soviet Union, China, and the United States, and to keep its nuclear option open. The Soviets,

on the other hand, seek to construct a dependable anti-China security system in Asia, and oppose the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

India's more noteworthy diplomatic advances with China have included the 1976 assignment of an Indian ambassador to Beijing for the first time in fourteen years; the 1978 visit of a Chinese delegation to New Delhi (and its invitation to Prime Minister Vajpayee to visit Beijing); and the 1981 trade and border talks between India and the Chinese foreign minister, Huang Hua. The last of these events was particularly important, because it opened discussions between the two countries on the long-standing border dispute which led to their 1962 war. In an attempt to settle the issue, Premier Deng Xiaoping offered to give up claims along the Assam border if the Indians were willing to do the same in Kashmir. Under this plan, the military lines of control would become the official borders, and Indian pilgrims would be permitted to visit Hindu shrines in Tibet.[6] If subsequent discussions on the pilgrimages and border settlement produce an agreement, India's dependence on the Soviet Union as a deterrent against Chinese border invasions would be virtually eliminated. Furthermore, the groundwork would be laid for improvement in other Sino-Indian matters.

In an effort to ease Soviet suspicions and fears of a pan-Asian condominium, the Indians have often stated that

normalization of relations between India and China will not be at the expense of India's friendship with any other country.[7] Nevertheless, Sino-Indian detente undermines Leonid Brezhnev's 1969 proposal for a system of collective security in Asia, and creates unease in Moscow. It also places the Soviets in a dilemma regarding how far they should push their own military objectives such as seeking more influence in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Tension in the Indo-Soviet relationship has also originated from Moscow's activities. New Delhi is suspicious of Soviet-American attempts to deny nuclear technology to Third World countries while the two superpowers push ahead with their own proliferous policies. Indian leaders regard these superpower attempts to monopolize nuclear weaponry with mixed emotions: some in India call for an autonomous, albeit expensive, countervalue missile development program, while others pit their hopes on a reduction of strategic inventories through a process of international diplomatic pressure.

Perhaps most destabilizing, however, is the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Thus far, the Indian government has confined itself to expressions of regret while refusing to join in international condemnation of the Soviet occupation. As Donaldson notes in a 1981 article, [8] refraining from public criticism is consistent with

Indian reaction to both the 1956 attack on Hungary and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

While abstaining from comment on Moscow's accusations that it was "provoked" into invading Afghanistan by U.S., Chinese, and Pakistani attempts to overthrow the pro-Moscow government in Kabul, the Indians have privately conveyed to Moscow their preference for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

It is not difficult to understand why a permanent Soviet presence in Afghanistan would strain the Indo-Soviet relationship. Afghanistan under the aegis of the British historically provided a strategic buffer between South Asia and the Russian Army. A permanent Soviet presence in Afghanistan would enable Moscow to influence and even intimidate the subcontinent with its military power. More important in the short run, the Soviet invasion and Soviet-sanctioned Afghan violations of the Pakistan border have revived the U.S.-Pakistani alliance, and reduced Indian primacy on the subcontinent.

Since the Soviet invasion, the Reagan Administration has pledged \$3.2 billion worth of assistance to Pakistan. Of this amount, \$2 billion will go toward military weapons, including 40 F-16 fighter aircraft. The increased American involvement with Pakistan has widened the gap between Pakistan and India, while raising fears in New Delhi that

American arms, supplied to defend against Russian hegemony, may once again be used against Indian troops.

India has other reasons to be uneasy about the continuing Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Aside from bringing Pakistan and the United States closer together, Pakistani support of the Mujahedin battling against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul has strengthened Pakistan's relations with other Islamic states. Thus, rather than aid Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, the Soviet invasion has enlarged Pakistan's range of alternatives. In the mind of one Pakistani observer,[9] Islamabad now has four options:

- (1) to rely on American (and Chinese) military assistance and guarantees;
- (2) to seek safety as part of the Moslem world;
- (3) to offer friendship to the Soviet Union;
- (4) to strive for the normalisation of relations with India and to act internationally in concert with India.

Clearly only the last option would fulfill Indian objectives. The first or second could lead to a permanent Soviet presence in Afghanistan and bolster the inflexibility of the military-dominated Pakistani regime toward reconciliation with India. The third was tried in the 1960's and raised such a storm of protest in India that the Soviets quickly abandoned their attempt to balance relations between the two countries for fear of losing

influence within India altogether. Today, with nations such as France, Italy, Great Britain, Brazil, and West Germany willing to deviate from a strictly bipolar definition of the world and to supply advanced technical and military goods to nonaligned or neutralist nations, this alternative would be even riskier for Moscow than before.

From the Indian perspective, a South Asian union, joined in its international purpose, has been the objective since the 1947 partition. The Afghanistan invasion frustrates this goal, and thus detracts from continued goodwill between the Soviet Union and India. The Soviet presence also raises serious questions in New Delhi regarding ultimate Soviet objectives. While Soviet goals thus far appear limited to maintaining a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, some in New Delhi cannot help but wonder whether secondary objectives encompass the Indo-Soviet military supply line. That is, how will Moscow benefit if America rearms Pakistan? Will the Indians increase their purchases of Soviet arms, or will they continue to diversify their purchases, as was done in the case of the 1979 SEPECAT Jaguar aircraft agreement? With diplomatic relations improving between Beijing and New Delhi, contracts between Moscow and New Delhi for the latest Soviet weaponry are seen as one means of maintaining Indian dependence on Moscow, at least until Indian production lines become self-sufficient.

Another destabilizing force surrounding the Soviet invasion is the refugee problem. Should the influx of Afghanistan refugees, the burden of defense spending and the lack of grassroots support for the Zia dictatorship combine to disintegrate Pakistan, Indians must wonder who will reap the rewards of dismemberment. Would pre-eminence in South Asia be shared between the Soviet Union and India if the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan or the North West Frontier were to become autonomous nations? Or would the Soviets, as the Indians would like, defer to their Indian friends?

In all of these calculations, the future of the zone of peace resolution looms in the background. Just as the Afghanistan invasion has tabled the talks at present, the disintegration of Pakistan, the creation of a pro-Moscow state between Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean, or an Indo-Pakistani union would alter the prospects of future negotiations on the resolution. And, one might add, each of these scenarios could lead to a shift in Indian perceptions about whether passage of the resolution was in the national interest or not.

B. SECURE INDEPENDENCE, MAINTAIN NONALIGNMENT AND UNDUE DEPENDENCE

Ultimately, India seeks to gain international recognition as a great power, interacting with all but

exclusively dependent on none. The Indians deny the Indo-Soviet Treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation represents an alliance, and they have taken steps to diversify their military, technical, and economic sources of supply, thereby enhancing their nonalignment policy. Indians condemn East-West polarization and superpower competition in the Third World, and they espouse the South's position in North-South issues. Domestically, India continues to pursue its own form of democratic socialism, and refuses to parrot foreign formulae for economic success.

In the early 1970's, India was considered by many Western nations to be a pro-Soviet power. This perception was based on such factors as the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, India's large importation of Soviet arms, unique Indo-Soviet aid and debt-servicing and Mrs. Gandhi's frequent references to India's "special relationship" with the U.S.S.R. Toward the latter half of the decade, India's political leaders sought to change the country's image. While most of the initiative for this shift came from Mrs. Gandhi's political opponents, there is ample evidence that concerns about excessive dependence upon the Soviet Union and an interest in technology which was not available from the U.S.S.R. contributed to the Indian drive for diverse suppliers.

The need to renew India's nonaligned credentials was emphasized by the Janata Party throughout the 1977

campaign. Soon after Mrs. Gandhi's defeat, Prime Minister Desai indicated the administration would move the country toward a more equidistant policy, free of "special relationships with other countries."^[10] Foreign Minister Vajpayee, even more critical of the previous administration, indicated that the Janata Party would seek to correct Mrs. Gandhi's "blunder of making India too...dependent on Soviet Russia"^[11] by pursuing a "genuinely nonaligned" course.^[12]

One of the first indications that these statements were more than political rhetoric was the rejection of Soviet aid and assistance in the second stage of construction at the Bokaro steel complex. Because the Soviets lacked the level of technology desired by Indian planners, two American firms were offered the job instead.^[13] Other instances of diversification included:

the replacement of Soviet designs for 200-Megawatt power generators by West Germany designs (for generators with 1,000-megawatt capacity), the gradual displacement of Russian antibiotics by drugs based on Italian technology, the replacement of Russian and Rumanian oil-exploration experts and of Soviet oil rigs with Western ones. The share of the Indian market for machinery and equipment accounted for by Soviet imports fell from about three-fourths in 1968 to under one-fourth in 1977.^[14]

In effect, India's rapid industrialization had equaled or surpassed the limits of Soviet technology in specific fields. In pursuit of a more independent foreign policy and in an effort to fulfill its higher technology needs,

the Desai government turned to Western Europe, Japan, and the United States.

This shift from Soviet dependence was not limited to civilian manufactures. In the defense sector, the Soviet Union had supplied roughly four-fifths of New Delhi's total military imports between 1965 and 1977, with more than half of the value of Soviet deliveries consisting of aircraft and related production facilities.[15] By 1978, however, West European industries had become extremely competitive in the international arms market, and India chose several Western licenses over advanced Soviet designs. Under a 1979 agreement, India purchased 40 SEPECAT (an Anglo-French company) Jaguar International tactical support aircraft instead of the advanced MIG-23. The agreement provided for a further 45 aircraft to be assembled in India from British-built components, leading eventually to indigenous manufacture under license by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.[16] Current Indian plans call for 150 aircraft in all, three-fourths of which will be assembled and/or built by H.A.L.

One reason cited for the shift to West European aircraft was Moscow's slow delivery of spare parts.[17] There have been similar reports of the Indian Navy's dissatisfaction with Indo-Soviet trade. Writing in 1977, one observer stated:

One of the most interesting developments in the Indian Navy has been an increasing degree of complaint against some of the major Soviet weapons systems including

submarines and aircraft. For example, the Indian Defense Diary cites with apparent approval American and British sources to the effect that the Indians are unhappy with the performance of the Russian F-class diesel-powered attack submarine. The Indians also complain that Russian-supplied naval craft have to undergo major modifications in Indian shipyards because they are unstable in open seas. Besides this, they complain about the lack of spare parts, and the fact that still most Indian servicemen are trained on British equipment and find the mixture of Soviet, British, and French supplies confusing. An Indian critic states that in 1967 India began to acquire Russian naval armaments, and then he says, "so we have 'modernized' our navy, but at what cost? The Russians, although they have translated technical books, have refused to impart tactical doctrines for the employment of their weapons system. This may well prove to be the Achilles of India's Russian Navy." [18]

Consistent complaints such as the one above have led the Indians to Western Europe in pursuit of modern submarine and surface ship systems. To replace the Soviet-built F-class diesel submarine, India has apparently signed an agreement with a Swedish firm for one submarine and the transfer of technology for pressure hull construction and arms. [19] To modernize its surface escort fleet, the Indian Navy acquired licenses for the British Leander-class frigate and approached the Dutch for assistance in designing the Leander's successor. [20] •

From these examples, it is apparent that India has decided to abandon exclusive dependence on Soviet arms transfers. Instead, the leadership has chosen to "go in for the best equipment regardless of political considerations and the rupee trade account." [21] The motivations underlying this recent trend, however, transcend India's

pursuit of diverse suppliers and a nonaligned reputation. These goals, while admirable politically, create their own logistical and maintenance nightmares. Rather, India is seeking technological parity. By purchasing technology transfers and engineering skills through licensing arrangements, India hopes to gain the knowledge necessary to achieve great power status.

In the bipolar world which existed in the 1950's, 1960's and early 1970's, a nonaligned developing nation such as India was forced to develop a "special relationship" with the East or West in order to acquire the skills and capital it required to raise itself up. Today, many other alternatives exist, and India, like any developing nation, is better able to aggressively negotiate for the most favorable terms. As long as this situation exists, India should be able to acquire the skills it needs to improve its global standing. Only if strict Western arms embargoes, familiar during the previous Indo-Pakistani wars, are once again levied will this situation change. Quoting from a 1970 naval journal:

Ultimately, however long it might take, India is going to become independent in shipbuilding, as in other fields. The direction its policies take and the posture that it assumes will be influenced by the treatment it receives at the hands of the powers who were in a position to help it. But, it will be difficult indeed for India to stand upright if the West continues to push it, however unwittingly, in the same directions as the Russians are pulling.[22]

In sum, India's pursuit of self-sufficiency is driven by its quest for great power status. Ultimately India seeks to become a leading industrialized nation, and the pre-eminent power in the Indian Ocean. For all its rhetoric about self-sufficiency, however, India remains a resource-poor country which will always be dependent on other nations for portions of its material, mineral, and energy needs. Thus, what India is realistically seeking is political, economic, and military parity with the great powers in an interdependent world. Considering the fact that nations such as Japan, France and West Germany, with far less resource wealth than India, have already achieved this state, it is entirely possible that India also will someday rise to the top. The limiting factors will be the rate at which India acquires the technology it needs, and how quickly it assimilates that which it acquires. Both of these factors will affect the degree of success India has in meeting its other foreign policy goals, as well as its relations with the Soviet Union.

C. INSULATE THE INDIAN OCEAN FROM GREAT POWER MILITARY ACTIVITY

India's promotion of the zone of peace resolution is one element of a national interest which seeks security from external military threat. Exclusion of external navies from the region would free India from the historical

threat of invasion from the south, and enable the country to become a premier power in the region. Despite the fact that India lacks the oil wealth of its Arab and Persian neighbors, its central position, sheer size and large populace would guarantee its status in an exclusively littoral system.

Since the passage of the 1971 U.N. General Assembly resolution declaring the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace, Moscow has sought Indian assistance in making a special case for the Soviet presence in the area. Specifically, the Soviets have stressed the recognized norms of international law concerning freedom of navigation in the open sea, the need for business calls at the ports of coastal states, and freedom of scientific research, while simultaneously seeking New Delhi's support for their argument that the Soviet Union has never had any military bases in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet effort to win diplomatic backing has achieved only limited success. In the U.N., India has consistently supported resolutions calling upon the elimination of bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons, and any other manifestation of great power military presence or rivalry in the Indian Ocean, and has thus diverged from Soviet abstentions on the zone of peace issue. Outside the U.N., India has been more conciliatory. When the U.S. began to upgrade its

facilities at Diego Garcia, Mrs. Gandhi distinguished between the Soviet and American navies in the area:

As for the difference between the Russian presence and the American presence, I think the difference is that the Russians do not have a base. They may be going back and forth, but we hear that the American base at Diego Garcia is going to be a nuclear base.[23]

But Mrs. Gandhi's successors, seeking a more nonaligned course, and also concerned about Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa, were less willing to make such a generous distinction. Following Prime Minister Desai's October 1977 visit to Moscow, a press report underscored his shift away from a pro-Soviet tilt:

As far as India was concerned, it would like to see all bases and such military or naval presence as are matters of concern to the littoral states be eliminated. [24]

Following the expulsion of the Soviets from Somalia and the suspension of Naval Arms Limitation Talks between the superpowers, Foreign Minister Vajpayee's statement in the Lok Sabha reemphasized the Janata administration's unwillingness to separate India's U.N. position and its public pronouncements:

The house is fully aware of the government's view that the military presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean is a cause of tension and insecurity in the area. The concept of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean implies the elimination of the foreign military presence from the area.[25]

In short, the Soviets succeeded only briefly in acquiring Indian support for differentiation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. presence in the Indian Ocean. Following

Mrs. Gandhi's defeat in 1977, domestic opinion favored a more nonaligned view on the zone of peace issue. Sensitive to the Soviet desire that a distinction be made between Soviet naval support facilities and the term "base," the Indians avoided the definitional aspects altogether by endorsing the U.N. prohibition of any non-littoral military presence.

Of course, India desires more from the zone of peace resolution than the elimination of superpower presence from the area: ideally, it would like to insulate all non-littoral powers from the region. At present, this includes British and French warships; looking further ahead, it would include the naval presence of China and other Far Eastern states.

While not accepting the presence of a French naval contingent in the Indian Ocean, the Indians know French interests in the region include the protection of:

- (1) energy and raw material supplies in the Middle East and Africa;
- (2) French citizens who live and work in the Middle East and Africa;
- (3) states threatened by Soviet hegemony;
- (4) the sealanes around Africa, and
- (5) diplomatic, economic, cultural, technical and military relations with nations which have recently achieved independence.

In many ways, India and France are very similar in their views on national self-determination,

non-interference in other nation's affairs, promotion of international peace, and peaceful cooperation among nations for mutual benefit. But India has a stronger history of anti-colonialism, and would prefer the French to devolve their traditional security duties to nations in the Indian Ocean littoral.

Like the French, the British also have traditional relations in the area with states which were formerly colonies. The British have largely withdrawn from the area but they maintain their Diego Garcia base and facility agreements with a few nations positioned between the Red and South China Seas. India views the withdrawal of the British from East of the Suez as a favorable trend--which is still far from complete.

Ultimately, India hopes to supplant the European and American presence with a number of its own diplomatic, economic, and military agreements. Five islands of the region are of particular interest in this respect, including Socotra, Diego Garcia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Mauritius. The first two of these are presently utilized by the Soviet Union, and the United States/Great Britain, respectively. Their geostrategic locations make their importance to India self-evident, and discussion of their roles as superpower bases have already been mentioned. Sri Lanka's strategic position beside India should also be self-evident. One writer has compared Sri Lanka's

position off India to that of Taiwan off China or Eire off Great Britain. He quotes an Indian view that as long as Sri Lanka is

friendly or neutral India could tolerate such a situation, but should there be any danger of the island falling under the domination of a power hostile to India, we would have to act to protect our integrity.[26]

The Maldives and Mauritius are also of strategic interest to India. Mrs. Gandhi visited the Maldives in January 1975, both in an effort to encourage early termination of the British lease on facilities in Maldives, and to strengthen relations between the Maldives and her own country. India's attraction to the Maldives includes "prospects for oil and other ocean resources in the vicinity of the archipelago," in addition to military facilities consisting of "a radio communication station, an airfield, advanced navigational aids with equipment for the reception of satellite weather pictures" and port facilities visited by U.S. and British warships.[27]

Since the early withdrawal of Britain from the Gan airbase, India has encouraged the Maldives' support for the U.N. zone of peace resolution, and was probably encouraged when the archipelago nation turned down a Soviet offer to lease Gan in late 1977. India's partiality toward Mauritius includes returning Diego Garcia to Mauritius and discouraging future base leasing arrangements between Mauritius and non-littoral naval powers. Mauritius'

location in the southwest corner of the Indian Ocean was especially important when the Suez Canal was closed following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; today, following the reopening of Red Sea route and subsequent improvement of the canal's deep-draft capability, Mauritius has lost some of its strategic importance. India remains interested in these two nations, however, and should seek to bring them into future political, economic, or military plans involving the Indian Ocean region.

In the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean, New Delhi fears encroachment from China, Southeast Asia, and Japan. India's fear of Japanese hegemony stems from memories of Japan's southward advance in World War II, and focuses today on Japan's energy and strategic material dependence. Ramazani suggests that constriction of Japanese energy and resource needs could encourage Japan to join ANZUS or the U.S. in protecting sea lanes which pass through the Indian Ocean.[28] Since the oil crises of 1973-74 and 1979, however, Japan has diversified its energy sources and types of fuels, and has begun to shift away from high energy consuming industries. India's perception of a Japanese "threat" (other than in terms of economic competition) should therefore lessen appreciably.

Fears of Chinese hegemony are quite another matter. Thus far the People's Republic of China has supported the U.N. resolution recognizing the Indian Ocean as a zone of

peace. Chinese support of the resolution and their refusal to make any distinction between Soviet or American forces when referring to Great Power rivalry in the area are obvious attempts to anger Moscow. Ideological differences aside, the Chinese are also seeking to undermine President Brezhnev's 1969 plan to isolate the People's Republic of China by creating a system of "collective security" in Asia. China's support of legislation opposed by the Soviets is one of a number of ways that China is seeking to exacerbate Indo-Soviet relations. It also suggests that China will be so preoccupied with internal political divisions, economic and technological problems, Sino-Soviet border security and the Taiwan issue that it will be unable to construct a credible naval projection capability for some time to come. Support of the U.N. resolution allows the P.R.C. to deny Soviet naval intervention in a region beyond Chinese influence.

The People's Republic of China's support of zone of peace legislation also stems from its economic vulnerability. Currently China is seriously deficient in material imports of chromium, cobalt, platinum metals, nickel, diamonds and magnesium. It also imports relatively large quantities of natural rubber, aluminum, copper, vanadium, sulfur, iron ore, and steel, although considerable production and reserves of these materials exist within the country.[29] Since many of these materials are

imported from Europe and Africa, and could be restricted by Soviet control of strategic chokepoints or Soviet intervention in Africa, the Chinese are extremely sensitive about increasing Soviet activities in these regions and along the Indian Ocean sealanes.

The Indians are aware of China's fears and realize that the economic growth of the P.R.C. will make the Chinese more dependent upon critical material imports, and hence more prone to deploy naval forces into the Indian Ocean to insure the security of their primary sealanes. India thinks it can prevent the entry of China's navy into the Indian Ocean if it can remove other foreign navies with passage of the U.N. zone of peace resolution. In the meantime, India has sought to avoid provoking the Chinese by refusing Moscow's persistent requests for exclusive port facilities [30] and offers for a joint Indo-Soviet effort in maritime cooperation.[31] Any such Indo-Soviet agreement would compromise Indian nonalignment, threaten the Sino-Pakistani alliance, and possibly spark a basing arrangement for U.S. and Chinese ships in Karachi.

In addition to its "passive" measures to placate Chinese fears, India has taken steps to guard its commercial interests in the Bay of Bengal and within the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) formulated at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. One such step is the installation of a unified command of the three

services (quartered in Port Blair) in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, with a view toward protecting sea communication from the South China Sea and the Pacific into the Indian Ocean. Situated 831 miles away from the mainland, these islands (the Andaman group has 204 islands and the Nicobars number 19) are perceived as "sentinels guarding the portals of India."^[32] And indeed, whether the Kra Canal is cut across Malaysia to facilitate the passage of increasingly large oil tankers presently unable to negotiate the Strait of Malacca, whether the Malacca strait is deepened (the most feasible option) or whether traffic is routed through the Sunda and Lombok Straits of Indonesia, India's interest in the eastern passages will continue. This is true not only because of perceived challenges emerging from the area, but also because nearly all Indian trade travels by sea. Like China, India expects its international commerce to expand in the decades ahead.

D. PROMOTE THE MAINTENANCE OF FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS

In addition to its diplomatic initiatives with Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China, India seeks to establish closer ties with Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. As an advocate of nonalignment, India wishes to free regional powers from foreign domination and intimidation, without creating unjustified fears of Indian hegemony. Farther afield, India desires closer diplomatic ties and

balanced diplomatic relations with the Persian Gulf states which India depends upon for nearly two thirds of her total petroleum requirements.

Both Moscow and New Delhi are in agreement on the need to counter Chinese communist influence in the regions bordering India. But tension exists between the two on the type of government which should exist in the place of Maoist ideology. Moscow prefers a system of collective security in Asia, while India favors an independent and democratic state system, free of foreign domination. In effect, the Soviets desire a pro-Moscow tilt in a bilateral world, viewed in zero-sum terms; the Indians favor non-alignment in an evolving multilateral system.

India's search for closer relations with other nonaligned powers has proven more successful than Moscow's hunt for signatories to the Asian Collective Security System. Karen Dawisha attributes part of Moscow's failure to the genuine antipathy of regional states (especially Islamic countries) to communism:

This antipathy stems not only from these states' ideological objections to communism, but also from their fear of its subversive potential within their own states.[33]

Dawisha adds that the invasion of Afghanistan multiplied this aversion to communism ten-fold and "undermined, more thoroughly than any other recent Soviet action, Moscow's credibility as a champion of the nonaligned and national

liberation movements."^[34] In deference to their fundamentalist Muslim brothers, as well as their own internal constituencies, many Middle East leaders have been forced to place Moscow at arm's length.

Nationalist sentiment in these countries continues to favor treaties of friendship and cooperation over entangling security pacts. Treaties allow Third World nations to demand economic, technical, and arms aid from the Soviets, while--as was the case in Egypt and Somalia,--allowing some measure of freedom when circumstances dictate a realignment of priorities.

Another reason Dawisha believes the Soviets have failed to gain a greater foothold in the region is that they have "underestimated the dependency of the elites in these countries on Western values, Western life-styles and traditional economic links with Europe and the United States."^[35] Nationalist sentiments may be just as strong as they were in the 1950's when Dulles tried to build an alliance pact to contain communism, but the choices no longer lie between just the two superpowers. Today Third World nations can choose among a variety of European ideologies.

India's common colonial heritage and adherence to the nonaligned movement add to her prestige in the region. But India's enmity with Islamic Pakistan, reluctance to publicly condemn Moscow's Afghanistan intervention, and

potential as a regional rival, have sometimes acted as liabilities upon her attempts to achieve closer ties with oil-rich neighbors in the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, India has secured several lucrative contracts in the area, and Indians working on Persian Gulf projects have helped offset India's hard currency oil debts through homeward remittances.

Writing in 1977, Rouhollah K. Ramazani foresaw the rise of two regional rivals within the Indian Ocean in the period between 1985-1995: India and Iran. Since the 1979 collapse of the Pahlavi Dynasty, and the 1980 Iraqi offensive along the Shatt-al-Arab River, predictions of Iran's ascent to great power status have been revised. Concerns voiced in 1977 about Iran's rapidly expanding naval fleet and air force, and Tehran's nuclear potential, have now shifted to encompass other states. Some observers point to an Egyptian, Saudi, or South African succession, but today all temper their remarks with an acknowledgement of inherent instabilities in each state's political foundation.

Because it still relies heavily upon Middle East fuel for a large proportion of its energy needs and thus, for its continuing economic growth, India remains distressed about the volatility of passions in the Middle East and the security of the Strait of Hormuz. Secondary concerns include Indian relations with states which straddle the

sealanes to European markets, and Indonesia's potential to dominate sealanes to the Pacific. India has improved its relations with Indonesia since the first oil shocks of 1973-74, but remains suspicious of the country because of Jakarta's expansionist tendencies in the 1960's.

In sum, India and the Soviet Union coincide in their goal of countering Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region. It is the methods they prefer which diverge: Moscow prefers a system of alliances, while New Delhi prefers diplomatic and economic relations which do not compromise its nonaligned position. India and the U.S.S.R. both prefer stability over such unknowns as fundamental religious movements. For Moscow, however, latent instabilities represent targets of opportunity which could ultimately test the Indo-Soviet relationship. Opportunities for Soviet intervention in Baluchistan and on either side of critical strategic chokepoints might force the Politburo to reassess its Indian Ocean policies and to act in its long-term interests--despite short-term credibility losses regarding its promotion of "status quo" Asian borders. Any effort to establish a Soviet state on the perimeter of the Indian Ocean, however, would dash Indian hopes of a zone of peace free of superpower influence, and lay the naval arms race at New Delhi's doorstep.

E. RECEIVE MATERIAL ASSISTANCE ON THE MOST FAVORABLE TERMS

India subscribes to the principles embodied in the New International Economic Order (a declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974) calling for the transfer of technology, capital and profits from the industrialized to the developing countries. The Indians believe that Third World nations should be allowed unrestricted access to world markets, in order that they might compete favorably for materials, minerals and fuels. In effect, Third World nations should be exempt from tariffs, duties and other protectionist measures applicable to industrialized competitors, while receiving financial subsidies to raise living standards. India views this assistance as an obligation of wealthy nations, which would prove all the more feasible if the arms race and the diversion of funds for military research, development, procurement and assistance were halted.

India's economic strategy seeks the maximum amount of national control and self-determination negotiable in the international economic system. Its affinity for public sector enterprise has at various times been chastized by Western economists as the defensive reaction of local elite groups seeking to protect their own power, of national business elements with their own ambitions, or of intellectuals animated by a doctrinaire hostility toward

capitalism. Others have described it as a fear of Western power extension, notably the "Trojan horse" syndrome, in which the foreign enterprise is seen as an agent of American diplomatic interests. In The Widening Gulf, Selig S. Harrison persuasively refutes these explanations as secondary to the often overlooked component of nationalism:

Measured by nationalist standards, public sector industrial development often takes clear preference, despite a record of relative inefficiency, because it lends itself to a greater degree of national control than private sector development as well as a greater eventual payoff in the state power needed for national security. It symbolizes national progress, equally shared, as against unbalanced development in which disparities in wealth multiply. It is seen as a pillar of self-reliance and independence. This identification of the public sector with the national interest is heightened when foreign investment pressures are directly targeted on public sector industry as an obstacle to investment objectives.[36]

In short, public sector enterprises represent a symbol of national progress while providing security from elites or foreign corporations seeking to multiply their concentrations of power. They allow the nation to safeguard control of key areas of the economy by reducing dependence on foreign aid and assistance, and hence improve the nation's autonomy in the international sphere.

Public sector enterprise is anathema to U.S. free-trade principles, however, and the U.S. government has historically rejected aid to India for "establishing government-owned industrial and commercial enterprises which compete with existing endeavors." [37] American distaste for

India's method of industrial development has been justified in terms of economic "inefficiency", "U.S. protectionism" (fear of eventual Indian competition with American industrial exports), and the desire to see India develop in the U.S. image, with private industry dominating the economy. But in the Third World, America's rebuffs have been interpreted as a method of confining the developing countries to agricultural pursuits, despite important U.S. contributions in the fields of power, transportation, and education.

Unwilling to compromise its own national formula for industrial development, India turned to other sources. Moscow proved receptive to India's quest for aid because of its identification with public enterprise and because of Pakistan's membership in an alliance structure affiliated with the containment doctrine. When the U.S. Congress rejected aid for the Bokaro steel complex in August 1963, India and the U.S.S.R. gravitated even closer together. Between 1950-51 and 1971-72, India's trade with the U.S.S.R. and Communist East Europe rose from 0.5 percent to 20 percent of her total exports, and from a negligible amount to fully 11 percent of her imports.[38]

One factor which enhanced this relationship was a special aid and debt-servicing agreement which allows Indian arms purchases without the expenditure of scarce foreign reserves. Soviet weapons are paid for with Indian

exports through a rupee account maintained at the Reserve Bank of India, which the Soviets have pledged to balance by importing goods and services of equal value from the subcontinent.[39] Another element was a Soviet economic aid package which amounted to \$1.943 billion in credits between 1954 and 1977.[40] Finally, the Soviets proved exceptionally reliable as an alternate supplier in times of extreme economic hardship. Instances of particular importance in this respect included Soviet delivery of fuel in the wake of the 1974 oil crisis, the 1976 shipment of heavy water for the Rajasthan power plant after a 1974 embargo by the U.S. and Canada, and a second oil agreement following the 1979 Iranian revolution.[41]

Despite these close relationships, there has been a recent decline in the importance of the bilateral relationship:

Although the volume of Soviet-Indian trade has continued to rise in the 1970's, the relative weight of Soviet imports and exports in the total Indian trade picture has fallen off since the peak years of the late 1960s and early 1970s.[42]

There has also been a reduction in India's drawdowns of Soviet credit. When Moscow offered a new \$340 million credit in 1977 (in anticipation of obtaining the contract for the second stage construction at the Bokaro steel complex), India still had over \$450 million available from previous agreements.[43]

The decline in India's dependence upon the Soviet Union stems from many factors, some of which were mentioned earlier. In the area of arms transfers, the lifting of the U.S. arms embargo in February 1975, the proliferation of alternative arms producers willing to grant manufacturing licenses, the greater availability of foreign exchange and credit, and India's ability to absorb more advanced technology, have all played a part. Another factor is the reduction of security threats resulting from the creation of Bangladesh and closer diplomatic ties with the P.R.C. In the economic sphere, the Soviet Union "has been reluctant to shift away from the traditional pattern of public-sector aid, involving primarily credits for heavily industrial equipment, to nonproject aid and the provision of raw materials, both of which are increasingly desired by the Indians as their own industrial capacity expands." [44] Development of the Indian economy has made it competitive with the U.S.S.R. in many of the same manufactures, and the Indians have sought to expand their commercial trade with the Common Market. Moreover, technology desired by India to increase productivity, particularly in the steel and oil industries, is often unavailable from Moscow. In these circumstances, India has been forced to turn to equity-sharing arrangements with foreign investors or to loans from commercial markets and international agencies. Such a compromise of national principles is not surrendered

without tough conditions. In oil exploration, for instance, India has insisted upon buying back at the prevailing international prices the entire quantity of any oil found until the country reaches self-sufficiency. And self-sufficiency, given present Indian reserves, is unlikely in this century.[45]

Despite these steps toward diversification, India's economic options are hampered by the high cost of its energy imports. Last year's crude oil and refined product import bill exceeded \$7 billion, equal to 80 percent of India's anticipated export earnings. It is probable, therefore, that India will remain dependent upon external assistance for some time to come, and that the Soviet Union, with whom New Delhi has already incurred a massive debt, will be the most likely source of future soft-currency funding. Only a shift in India's willingness to accept foreign equity investment could change this, and, considering the extreme reluctance on the part of the country to make such a change in its nationalist policies, this outcome seems doubtful.

F. SUMMARY

Writing in 1973, Stephen P. Cohen described the foreign policies of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh as "reactive". Each of these nations, he wrote, recognizes the marginal role of the region, and shares four common assumptions:

Briefly, these are: that the major threat comes from the immediate region; that each regional power lacks the resources to adequately defend itself and simultaneously fulfill economic objectives; that external ties must be developed to overcome such deficiencies, and finally, that because of the peripheral nature of the region, no outside power can be fully trusted to fulfill any but the most trivial commitments.[46]

To a large extent, this analysis remains valid. Despite its rhetorical quest for self-sufficiency, India is a member of an increasingly interdependent global system, and will remain dependent on others for political, economic, military, scientific and technological support. Its fierce national pride will resist agreements which seek quid pro quo tradeoffs, and aid received will be perceived as an obligatory tribute rather than a gift requiring a demeaning expression of gratitude.

The most critical relationship between Moscow and New Delhi will continue to be the economic tie. Moscow has been exceptionally generous over the past three decades in sharing its technology and assisting India's public sector development. Moscow's economy has slowed substantially in recent years, however, and increasingly the two nations have been forced to part company to fulfill their individual economic needs. In fact, the U.S.S.R. and India have been competing for many of the same kinds of Western assistance. Russia's great mineral and material wealth favor her in any competition for state-of-the-art technology; Western technology is expensive and the Soviets

have had to divert resource exports to Western markets to pay for imported capital equipment. This has resulted in a constriction of supplies to Eastern bloc partners, and rejection of Indian requests for raw material aid. For the rest of the 1980s, the Soviet economy will continue to require the best price available for its natural resource exports. India will, therefore, have to improve its productivity to generate the hard currency needed to purchase its raw material requirements.

The Indo-Soviet military element has become a secondary factor in bilateral relations. Pakistan is presently pre-occupied with Afghanistan and its own internal political climate. Sino-Indian rapprochement has lessened India's need for Soviet power to check border tensions. But China and India are still not close friends, and India continues to favor Moscow's record of reliability over China's changing internal schisms. Eventually India may possess the technology and economic capacity to develop its own force de frappe. Its program of rocket and missile research has already moved in this direction. But India remains divided about whether it should develop a nuclear force, and if so, what sort and how big. Although not stated in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, India's friendship with Moscow suggests that the Soviets might, if pressed to the extreme limits of their patience, exercise the nuclear option to protect their South Asian friend. But the

Indians are a proud people and could decide to construct an independent countervalue system capable of reaching Chinese cities. Moscow would certainly disapprove of an Indian ballistic missile deployment; but neither the Chinese, Soviets, or Americans would be surprised by such a course. India has long maintained that the superpowers have no right to condemn Third World nuclear proliferation while building larger and larger nuclear armories of their own. Mrs. Gandhi has repeatedly stressed that India will not sit idle while other nations fix the limits of their forces and restrict technology and fuel transfers to the Third World. The superpowers must reduce their nuclear inventories soon, or expect new members to join the "nuclear club".

In the political sphere, India and the Soviet Union should remain friends. Their ideologies differ but it is doubtful that communism will make major inroads on the subcontinent. The Hindu culture and caste system remain as impervious as ever, and the Moslems reject the tenets of communist atheism. Nevertheless, questions surrounding the occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean, and superpower arms negotiations continue to strain Indo-Soviet relations in the political sphere. Thus far Prime Minister Gandhi's government has abstained from two U.N. General Assembly votes condemning the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, and has publicly condemned Pakistan for its refusal to recognize the Moscow-

installed government of Babrak Karmal. India has even gone so far as to blame Pakistan for intentionally blocking an agreement that would allow the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. At the same time, India insists that it has told top Soviet leaders to withdraw its troops.[47]

Still, public abstention in the U.N. General Assembly has cost India a large measure of political capital. Though consistent with India's trend of not publicly condemning Soviet interventions, once again the credibility of India's nonalignment has been called into question. Despite Mrs. Gandhi's contention that Pakistan is obstructing the peace process in order to gain American and West European aid, in addition to increased status within the Islamic world, she certainly realizes that the Soviet presence initiated this complex train of events leading up to Pakistan's enhanced image. As if to return New Delhi's favor, Leonid Brezhnev emphasized the need to create a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean during the 26th Party Congress in February 1981. Moscow's call for peace cost the Politburo far less than Mrs. Gandhi's pro-Moscow abstention, however, because it is Soviet actions on the Horn of Africa and in Afghanistan which initially derailed, and have continued to impede, further negotiations. In short, there is every indication that India is growing impatient for action to back up Soviet rhetoric.

This impatience also extends into the realm of superpower arms negotiations. On the one hand, India remains eternally suspicious of any talks which threaten a division of the world into Soviet-American spheres of influence. On the other hand, India strongly endorses sharp reductions of superpower forces. Since any major arms reduction would lessen the gap between India's forces and those of other great powers--and thereby enhance India's world power status--such support should come as no surprise. But India's quest for international prestige has been clouded by Soviet deployment of long-range theatre nuclear weapons, the Backfire bomber, and newer and larger conventional forces. In spite of a long friendship the Soviet build-up in the face of Western military reductions concerns Indian strategic planners. Even before the Afghanistan invasion, it was generally accepted that the superpowers were only interested in achieving strategic superiority over each other.[48] Following the Afghanistan invasion, some have probably begun to wonder whether the U.S.S.R. is a friend or foe.

The crucial element in future Indo-Soviet relations will be the China factor. This is where Cohen's quotation, which opened this section, is vulnerable. Whatever the ideological differences, the Soviet Union needs India as a counterweight to a hostile China. Where America's need to befriend either Pakistan or India has oscillated over the

course of history, as if part of a great game; the Soviet Union, as an Asian power, has always considered it a necessity to become involved with its neighbors. It has invested a great sum of capital and time in the Asian subcontinent, without obtaining either base-rights or Indian support for the collective security system. Nor has Moscow succeeded in deterring India's independent pursuit of its own national interests. Yet in all likelihood, the Soviets will continue to invest heavily in the relationship to avoid losing such a consistent and reliable friend--in a region of great importance to Soviet security.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Indians have frequently railed against proponents of the balance-of-power thesis. Writing in the early 1970's, for example, an Indian Captain stated:

In the China-South and Southeast Asian ellipse, India is one of the 'policy centers' where power must concentrate; such power being ranged against China's land and sea frontiers. In this context...to believe that any country other than India will have either the will or the capacity to range forces along the mighty Himalayas to thwart Chinese design is to believe, to say the least, in a myth that Britain had, in the postwar world, such a capability in South Asia and her withdrawal from the east to Suez will create vacuum.[1]

Certainly, in terms of national will, no one is better suited to deter a drive into the subcontinent than India. But in terms of capabilities, there can be little doubt that the Soviet Union has a far greater military capacity to "thwart Chinese design," and that the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty plays a major role in restricting Chinese objectives. Moreover, technology's advance continues to frustrate Indian designs for great power status. Even as India plans its blue-water fleet for tomorrow, the science of missiles and rockets, combined with space-based command, control, and communications (C³) systems threatens this fleet with obsolescence.

It is for reasons such as these, perhaps, that the non-aligned nations of the world have called for the end of the

arms race and the creation of non-nuclear zones throughout the world. Like these other pleas, the zone of peace resolution is a call for limiting the Hydra-like expansion of superpower competition. But it is directed at only the manifestation of the problem, and not its source. Arms transfers, arms races, force increases, and placement of these forces are symptoms of competing interests in a world filled with distrust and suspicion.

The zone of peace resolution is a manifestation of the interests of nonaligned states such as India. It is based on the assumption that if the superpowers clear out of the Indian Ocean, the littoral powers will be able to resolve their differences on a more equitable--perhaps even peaceful--basis. But this premise suffers from several problems, not the least of which is that the littoral states of the Indian Ocean are not equal states. Some are blessed with greater material resources than others, some are blessed with greater human resources and others are blessed with greater territorial size. Each of these local states has its own national interests in the region; and interests, when combined with capabilities to suit them, have sometimes resulted in friction and acts of violence.

The removal of non-littoral naval forces from the Indian Ocean would not prevent the outbreak of conflict within the region. Nor would a continued superpower presence necessarily result in a lessening of tensions.

Yet many littoral states believe that such an exodus would benefit the region. It is this paper's contention that this argument originates from the competing interests of the littoral states, that these nations believe that such a departure would give their people the freedom to fulfill their own hegemonic aims unencumbered by outside powers capable of restricting their ambitions. Furthermore, these states believe that the removal of outside powers will enable them to "catch up" with the superpowers in terms of military and economic capabilities. In short, they think economic and social development will advance quickly as long as the diplomatic arm keeps non-regional interlopers at bay.

The weakness of this argument is that it ignores the substance of the problem. Unless the source of competing national interests is resolved, conflict will continue to exist, be it at the superpower level, the regional level, the subcontinent level, or the intrastate level. Removal of naval warships from the Indian Ocean does not remove the national interests of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., or any other non-littoral nation, from the region. The form of global competition might change, but the cause of the competition would not. Technological development would pursue a means of protecting individual interests, and a new method of making ones' influence felt within the region would emerge. Just as the U.S. need not station troops in the Soviet

Union to make its strategic presence known in this age of intercontinental weapons, a nation need not maintain a platform in the Indian Ocean to make its presence felt there.

Today, however, such technology does not exist. While some writers will argue that the U.S. Navy is in the region to protect weaker nations against the stronger, and others argue that the U.S. Navy is present to reaffirm its close friendships with nations in the region, these missions are secondary priorities. America is present in the Indian Ocean because it has interests there, such as oil, minerals, and raw materials, which have increased in importance over the past three decades. And the means to protect those interests from outside the region do not yet exist. Even if the U.S. wished to devolve the role of "regional policeman" to states such as India or Saudi Arabia, America knows that the regional states are hardly strong enough to protect themselves, much less join together to give assistance to a neighbor whose sovereignty is threatened.

The lesson of Chad is instructive in this respect. For all the pleading and government level negotiations, it took the French government several years to build a coalition peace-keeping force from members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to replace Libyan troops in Chad. Even after member-states agreed to join the force, Libya had to

be encouraged to leave. Similar negotiations are taking place today on the rim of the Indian Ocean in an attempt to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Iran-Iraq war, the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. But, as in the case of Chad, negotiations are slow and distrust among conferees is great. From this standpoint, it is premature to think that a zone of peace conclusion, satisfactory to the nonaligned nations, will be reached in the near future. Any agreement which permanently restricts the size of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean or eliminates these forces altogether would place the U.S. at a great disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or any other regional competitor. Through technological progress the Soviet Union could remove its naval forces from the region and still present its neighbors with an overwhelming military fait accompli. Those doubtful of this argument have only to regard the recent history of the SS-20 (4,500 kilometer, three warhead, mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile system) deployment in Western Russia, the expansion and modernization of the Soviet Union's airlift capabilities, and the increased size and capability of the Soviet armed forces.

The United States should not surrender its naval options. This does not imply that these forces must be increased or maintained at a high level. Short of a direct challenge to U.S. interests, or a request for U.S.

assistance, the U.S. presence in the region could be small and unobtrusive. If the U.S. were to correctly define its regional interests and construct its forces to support these defined roles, the number of naval vessels could be reduced. A total exodus could only be made, however, if adequate airlift existed to "surge" forces to the area in times of crisis. Currently the U.S. lacks an airlift capability which can credibly resupply the Indian Ocean theatre, hence the U.S. cannot afford to withdraw its entire naval contingent. Any drawdown of forces must be linked with improved airlift capabilities and the activities of the Soviet Union and its proxy forces.

In addition to the United States' need for a rapid surge capability, the U.S. must accelerate its space research, particularly in terms of reconnaissance and command, control and communications (C³) capabilities. A sophisticated space technology is essential in a region so distant from the U.S. mainland. Land-based facilities in this region of the world are politically unreliable, and are maintained at enormous cost both to the U.S. and its alliance partners. The competing forces of nationalisms are particularly strong in the Indian Ocean region and should be respected, rather than tested, by the use of U.S. space-based systems to provide early warning of changing force deployments and similar crucial intelligence information. Improved satellite reconnaissance would also

represent a major step forward in constructing satisfactory confidence-building measures to allay feelings of distrust and suspicion surrounding superpower competition.

Obviously the first step for the superpowers is to reach agreements on mutually satisfactory surveillance and verification procedures, in order to strip away the distrust and secrecy which plague the negotiating environment. This will prove particularly difficult for the Soviet Union to accept, because of its xenophobic national character. But it must be done, or the same verification problems which defeated the ratification of SALT II will occur again.

Another major step toward the eventual enactment of the zone of peace resolution is for the U.S. to come to terms with a long-range plan for the Third World. Since the second World War, the U.S. has attempted to impose rigid alignments or to enforce a status quo policy, even when "status quo" translated into support of colonialism, racism, or autarky. "The U.S.S.R. has consistently demonstrated more psychological and diplomatic skill than the United States" in handling nationalist or pacifist movements, Pierre Hassner has written, "but American leverage and penetration have invariably proved superior." [2] The reason for America's success is that it respects religion, promotes freedom, believes in the goodness of man, and represents technical progress. Each

of these values is highly esteemed in most of the Third World, yet the U.S. has often lost favor among this audience because these are not the values America has encouraged among its alliance partners. Human rights, when properly promoted, are an excellent foreign policy tool.

America's greatest foreign policy tool, however, is its vast store of capital, technology, and skilled workers. Mrs. Gandhi has stressed repeatedly that security lies in economic assistance and not security pacts. An educated citizenry is the cornerstone of ensuring the survival of a democratic system, and an employed and prosperous workforce rarely turns on its leadership. The Third World desires its own Marshall Plan, in order to fulfill its destiny as a global partner. If it consolidated its efforts, the West could fabricate a politico-economic plan far beyond an ambitious Moscow's scope. Such a plan would serve Western strategic objectives and fulfill the needs of the Third World. More importantly, the plan would engender the principle of prevention, rather than crisis-management.

If successful, Third World progress toward its goal of equal partnership would accelerate, and the day when the U.S. could devolve the security of the Indian Ocean to true friends in the region would be so much closer. And the objective that all parties have worked for, a zone of peace, might just come to pass.

NOTES

CHAPTER II

1. Devendra Kaushik, The Indian Ocean: Towards a Peace Zone (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972), pp. 139-140.

2. Ibid, p. 140.

3. That is, China, with whom India had fought a 1962 war and which was preparing to test its first nuclear weapon less than ten months later (16 October 1964).

4. Kaushik, p. 145.

5. Ibid.

6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1975 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 60.

7. The latter three were returned to Seychelles when it was granted independence in June 1976. The Chagos Archipelago was retained as a site for joint US/UK military facilities.

8. Today claims regarding dismemberment are moot. Seychelles, as noted earlier, received its former islands, along with its independence in June 1976. Mauritius, however, claimed in 1976 that the lease to the U.S. was a complete surprise and when the lease expired, Diego Garcia would return to Mauritius without payment of exchange. Under pressure from the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), which won a majority in the parliamentary elections of December 1976, Mauritius has since claimed that the 1965 agreement signed with the U.K. was made "under duress," and hence, is not legal. Area analysts agree that this implies Mauritius would like to replace the U.K. as the collector of U.S. rent.

9. Kaushik, p. 155.

10. Ibid, p. 154.

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11. R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Indian Ocean (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1972), p. 63.

12. Examples include R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell, above, and Alvin J. Cottrell and Walter F. Hahn, Indian Ocean Naval Limitations: Regional Issues and Global Implications (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1976).

13. Kaushik, p. 194.

14. Kaushik, p. 109.

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
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
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APPENDIX A

MAP 1
SELECTED NAVAL FACILITIES



MAP 2
SEA ROUTES AND CHOKES POINTS



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